VA: Specific issue reversed on by court of appeals was not properly presented by motion to suppress; reversal reversed

Motion to suppress did not allege a violation of curtilage so it was not properly before the court of appeals, so that part of the court of appeals opinion as to curtilage is ordered striken and the conviction affirmed. Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 20 (2010), modifying Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 643, 674 S.E.2d 558 (2009):

In Vaughn’s motion to suppress filed in the circuit court, he argued, inter alia, that the search of the property violated the Fourth Amendment because “[t]here were insufficient underlying facts and circumstances presented to the officers for there to have been probable cause to believe that there was evidence located at the property that was subject to seizure[, c]onfiscation of the allegedly stolen items cannot be justified under any ‘plain view’ doctrine where the discovery was anticipated[, and t]here were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of the property.” While Vaughn did argue that the Fourth Amendment requirements for a warrantless search of a dwelling’s curtilage, i.e., probable cause and exigent circumstances, see Robinson, 273 Va. at 34, 639 S.E.2d at 221, were not met, Vaughn did not contest the lawfulness of the officer’s presence in his backyard where the stolen items were plainly in view, or cite any cases that dealt with the doctrine of implied consent.

Being in a high crime area, flight on seeing the police, grabbing his pocket like securing a gun all added up to reasonable suspicion. He fell on gravel and the police caught up, and he admitted having a gun when collared. That was reasonable suspicion. Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268 (2010).*

The officer’s “recent observations of Lawson leaving his apartment in his Jeep and apparently conducting drug transactions from his Jeep in a nearby park on multiple occasions, along with Tennis’ information indicating that Lawson was also selling cocaine from his apartment, clearly established reasonable articulable suspicion (if not probable cause) that Lawson was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” Lawson v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 549, 687 S.E.2d 94 (2010).*

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