CA4: Officers in a house by consent could follow a blood trail

District Court erred in granting a motion to suppress in the face of broad consent to search. The officers inside observed a blood trail in the house, and they would have been derelict in not following it. United States v. Coleman, 588 F.3d 816 (4th Cir. 2009):

Not only was the bedroom within the scope of the consent search, but the officers also would have been derelict in their duty not to follow a blood trail from the kitchen. Far from not being part of the crime scene, as Coleman argues, see Br. of Appellee 15, nothing less than a trail of blood led to the master bedroom from the kitchen where the shooting occurred.

Further, at the time of the search the officers had no way of knowing whose blood trail they were following. They knew that Coleman had been shot, but Sergeant McIntosh also testified that there were reports that one of the intruders may have been shot as well. At a minimum, the trail of blood was likely to lead to evidence of some kind, even if nothing more than physical corroboration of events as told by witnesses. Furthermore, for all that the officers knew, the trail of blood could have led directly to a suspect, or it could have led to another victim in need of assistance. In short, there were any number of reasons why officers, based on what they knew, behaved reasonably by following the blood trail.

Plaintiffs were police supervisors and were fired by the Baltimore mayor, and he directed that their badges and IDs be retrieved. This was arguably a search and seizure, but it was in an employment context, not a law enforcement context, and it was not shown to be unreasonable.
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2009).*

Consent to search does not require that every officer know about it or its limits. A bag was requested to be opened because consent did not include breaking into it. United States v. James, 356 Fed. Appx. 636 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished):

However, “general, blanket consent to search … by itself would not permit officers to break into a locked container located within the area being searched.” Jones, 356 F.3d at 534 (emphasis in original).

Here, James informed Officer Michael Brewton that law enforcement could search the vehicle he was driving. While this information was not specifically conveyed to the other officers on the scene prior to the initiation of the search, this does not render the consent invalid. Moreover, Brewton testified that he would have instructed the officers to stop the search if James had not consented. Although the luggage found in the vehicle was locked, officers did not force it open. James informed Brewton that his wife, a passenger, had the keys, and in the meantime Mrs. James had willingly unlocked a bag and turned the keys over to Small, without objection from James. His “failure to object (or withdraw his consent) … is a strong indicator that the search was within the proper bounds of the consent search.” Jones, 356 F.3d at 534.

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