CA7 declines again to decide whether a person not on rental agreement has “standing”

Second search of defendant’s property finding child porn was with consent and was validly used to enhance his sentence. He first objected, but then he withdrew the consent. United States v. Cottle, 355 Fed. Appx. 18, 2009 FED App. 0755N (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Seventh Circuit declines to join the split on whether a person not on a rental contract has “standing” [n. 2; a word it notes the Supreme Court does not use anymore] because there was cause for the search no matter what. United States v. Brown, 355 Fed. Appx. 36 (7th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

During a knock and talk, defendant let officers into his house, and marijuana was in plain view. He consented to a further search of the basement finding more than 100 plants. United States v. Wise, 588 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 2009), affg United States v. Wise, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62966 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 18, 2008).*

District court did not err in finding that the search of defendant’s car for which there was PC to believe was involved in a robbery of a cocaine stash house was reasonable as an impoundment. [It also appears to be valid as an automobile exception search.] United States v. Ulloa, 355 Fed. Appx. 286 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished), cert. den. 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3053 (U.S., Apr. 5, 2010).*

Not a Fourth Amendment case, but interesting: A Navy regulation requires disclosure of civil drug and alcohol arrests. Defendant’s compelled report could not be used against him under the Fifth Amendment under Kastigar. United States v. Serianne, 68 M.J. 580 (N.-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2009).*

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