E.D.Cal.: Excessive destruction of property during execution of a SW stated a claim

Excessive and unnecessary destruction of property during execution of a search warrant states a claim for relief. Pacific Marine Ctr., Inc. v. Silva, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110617 (E.D. Cal. November 30, 2009):

“[O]fficers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 99 S.Ct 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979). “Destruction of property that is not reasonably necessary to effectively execute a search warrant may violate the Fourth Amendment.” Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 221 U.S. App. D.C. 227 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis, … governs the method of execution of [a search] warrant. Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression.” U.S. v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S. Ct. 992, 140 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1998) (“[e]xcessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.”); See Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (“only unnecessarily destructive behavior, beyond that necessary to execute a warrant effectively, violates the Fourth Amendment”). “An officer’s conduct in executing a search is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s mandate of reasonableness from the moment of the officer’s entry until the moment of departure.” San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 546 U.S. 1061, 126 S. Ct. 796, 163 L. Ed. 2d 627 (2005). Therefore, the touchstone of conduct during a search is “reasonableness.”

Plaintiffs have alleged conduct which may go beyond “reasonableness” to execute the warrant. Plaintiffs have adequately plead that defendant Essegian unnecessarily destroyed property during the search. Plaintiff alleges that the business was “ransacked” and all of the business documents were thrown about the business premises, and the surveillance equipment was ripped from the wall. In his motion, Essegian asks the Court to make factual determinations that Essegian was justified in doing the things alleged in the complaint as part of the scope of the search. Whether the conduct was necessary to effectively execute the search warrant is a factual question which cannot be determined at this point of the litigation. At this stage of the pleadings, the Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d at 588.