N.D.N.Y.: USPO did not violate separation of powers when it reported defendant’s violation of supervised release that led to a new indictment

USPO did not violate is statutory authority or separation of powers in first investigating defendant’s admissions to his mental health counselor that he was viewing child pornography and then assisting USAO in the case. United States v. Jennings, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109025 (N.D. N.Y. November 23, 2009):

For similar reasons, the Court also finds that the USPO did not exceed its constitutional authority. Defendant contends that prosecuting crimes is within the sole province of the executive branch, that it is outside the scope of the judiciary to institute new criminal proceedings, and that the instant matter blurs the roles of each branch because “if the probationer feared that information candidly shared with Probation was going to form the basis of a separate criminal prosecution, the probationer would have no incentive to honestly participate in his own recovery … [and] limiting criminal investigations and the initiation of criminal proceedings to the executive assures that the constitutional rights of a probationer … are guarded through the well-established rules of criminal procedure ….”

. . .

The USPO’s statutory duties of keeping informed of whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of release necessarily overlap some law enforcement duties. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2025. That the results of the USPO’s duties may have dual uses (i.e. forming the basis for a revocation of supervised release and the initiation of new criminal charges) does not run afoul of the separation of powers. In this case, the undisputed evidence is that the USAO was involved in the criminal investigation from an early stage. The record evidence is that the USAO: (1) conferred with the USPO concerning obtaining a search warrant; (2) prepared the warrant application based on information obtained from the USPO; (3) presented the warrant to this Court; (4) made the decision to file new criminal charges; (5) made the decision as to which criminal charges to pursue, see Gov’t Mem. of Law at 19; (6) prepared the felony complaint, see Lovric Aff. at P 23; (7) filed the criminal charges; (8) presented the matter to a grand jury; and (9) continues to prosecute the charges against Defendant. The probation officer has no role in how the information submitted to the USAO is used by it. See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 777 (7th Cir. 2006). Inasmuch as the Executive Branch has been involved from an early stage and has made the critical determinations whether, and how, to proceed with new criminal charges against Defendant, the Court finds no encroachment that violated the separation of powers doctrine. Nothing the USPO did interfered with the Executive Branch’s ability to make law enforcement decisions or perform law enforcement functions. See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 189.

For a COA in a § 2254 case, reasonable jurists could not find the district court’s decision remotely wrong that “video pornography” implicitly includes only commercially made and not defendant’s homemade. Satterlee v. Addison, 354 Fed. Appx. 292 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s guilty plea was unconditional, but the government concedes that he wanted to reserve the right to appeal, so the plea is vacated and remanded for a do over. United States v. Ochoa, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25768 (11th Cir. November 24, 2009) (unpublished).*

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