N.D.Ill.: Exclusionary rule would not be applied to determine what was covered by suppression order

The court suppressed the search of one of defendant’s residences, but there was a dispute as to which computer of two computers came from there. The exclusionary rule would not be applied to a hearing to decide which was which. It served no purpose of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Conrad, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (interesting opinion on essentially applying the exclusionary rule to a second hearing on the suppression issue; it says it is unique but it could come up again):

Applying the exclusionary rule here would also impose substantial societal costs. The purpose of the July 2009 hearing was to determine which laptop computer was obtained at the Geneva Residence and therefore subject to the Court’s earlier suppression order. The application of the rule would inhibit that purpose, as the evidence Defendant seeks to exclude from consideration will assist the Court in making its decision. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 621 (the exclusionary rule would “unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury’s duties”).

Additionally, applying the rule here would be inconsistent with the more relaxed procedures that apply to suppression hearings. “[T]he rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73, 94 S.Ct. 988, 994 (1974). See also id. at 175, 94 S.Ct. at 995 (“There is, therefore, much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence, the exclusionary rules, aside from rules of privilege, should not be applicable; and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel.”); United States v. Watson, 87 F.3d 927, 930 (7th Cir. 1996) (construing Matlock‘s holding to mean “aside from privilege, exclusionary rules should not apply in a proceeding in which the court itself is considering the admissibility of evidence”). Just as in other proceedings to which the exclusionary rule does not apply, the court presiding over a suppression hearing “does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence” and is “unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 620. See also Scott, 524 U.S. at 365-66, 118 S.Ct. at 2020-21 (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings, which are “traditionally flexible” and in which the “traditional rules of evidence generally do not apply”). Even though suppression hearings are not bound by the traditional rules and procedures applied to trials, the Court notes that Defendant Conrad had the ability to cross-examine the Government’s witnesses and present his own evidence.

Plaintiff’s arrest for domestic violence was in his house, without exigent circumstances, and thus violated Payton. Denton v. Rievley, 353 Fed. Appx. 1, 2009 FED App. 0736N (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Stop for illegally tinted windows was valid and with PC. United States v. Leonard, 356 Fed. Appx. 231 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*