KY: On seeing the police, suspicious conduct + flight = RS

Flight after suspicious conduct is reasonable suspicion. Defendant saw police and went onto a porch and fiddled with a door and then fled when they were looking at him. Akins v. Commonwealth, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 199 (October 16, 2009):

Akins contends that he was not subject to an ordinary investigatory stop on Valley Creek Road based on his behavior as observed by the police. We do not agree. His conduct on the porch itself under the circumstances furnished an articulable, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed2d 889 (1968). His reactions to the police–taking immediate, evasive flight upon seeing Kelly’s vehicle approach and then leaping from the porch as the two vehicles approached–also furnished reasonable, articulable suspicion for the initial stop. The United States Supreme Court has held that the fact of flight at the mere sight of the police constitutes the reasonable suspicion required to justify a Terry stop:

Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight–wherever it occurs–is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, (citations omitted) 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).

Note: the court left out from the quote the sentence before: “In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.” That should have been included.

Defendant was the passenger in a car stopped based on a telephone call from Walgreens about overpurchase of pseudophedrine, and the pseudo was on the seat in plain view. He had standing to challenge the stop, and he loses. As for the search of the car, he has no standing to challenge its search under Rakas. Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 522 (Ky. App. 2009).*

Probable cause for search of defendant’s truck for cash was based on wiretaps and observations that were consistent with the wiretaps. The truck was mobile, so the automobile exception applied. United States v. Longoria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96333 (N.D. Ga. August 13, 2009).*

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