CA6: FPS officers could arrest off federal property

“Evans claims that the Federal Protective Service (“FPS”) officers who conducted an investigative stop of her vehicle violated her Fourth Amendment rights by exceeding their jurisdictional authority under 40 U.S.C. § 1315. We disagree and affirm. In doing so, we hold that the FPS officers reasonably exercised their investigative and protective authority pursuant to § 1315 when they left federal property to surveil Evans’s vehicle. We further hold that Evans’s conduct, specifically, her tailgating of the FPS officers’ marked police vehicle and her visible hand gestures, which simulated the firing of a gun, provided the FPS officers with probable cause to arrest her, regardless of her presence on non-federal property.” United States v. Evans, 581 F.3d 333, 2009 FED App. 0341P (6th Cir. 2009).

Officers had reasonable suspicion for his stop either from his driving or the three days of surveillance of his activities. A hidden compartment gave PC to search. United States v. Carmenate, 344 Fed. Appx. 941 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished):

Specifically, the visual inspection under Carmenate’s truck did not require his consent. See United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1990). The subsequent discovery of suspicious markings created a reasonable belief that the truck contained a hidden compartment. See United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 724 (5th Cir. 1994). “[E]vidence of a hidden compartment supports ‘probable cause’ for a search/arrest.” United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). When probable cause for a search exists, consent is not required. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 666 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that a search is permissible without a warrant as long as there is “either the consent of the owner to conduct the search or probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime”).

Gun was revealed by plain view of shining a flashlight into the defendant’s car during a traffic stop. United States v. Jackson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85974 (W.D. Pa. September 21, 2009).*

The search of defendant’s car for evidence of fraud was permissible under the automobile exception, and it was not a search incident. United States v. Owen, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85929 (S.D. Miss. August 28, 2009).*

Defendant’s conclusory allegation that defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress was an insufficient ground for post-conviction relief. Tidwell v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86115 (M.D. Ga. July 24, 2009).*

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