MN: Biographical information obtained in violation of constitutional is subject to the exclusionary rule

Biographical information obtained in violation of constitutional is subject to the exclusionary rule. State v. Maldonado-Arreaga, 772 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. App. 2009):

The federal circuits have taken different approaches to how Lopez-Mendoza relates to challenges to biographical/identity evidence in criminal proceedings. See United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit cases). The most persuasive discussion is found in Guevara-Martinez. There, appellant was fingerprinted after an illegal traffic stop, and subsequently charged with being an illegal alien found in the United States after deportation. Id. at 752. He moved to suppress fingerprint evidence as well as statements he made about his identity, and the government opposed the motion by relying on the same language from Lopez-Mendoza identified by respondent in this case. Id. After reviewing Lopez-Mendoza and the interpretations of it by the various circuit courts, the Guevara-Martinez court concluded that Lopez-Mendoza’s statement about the suppression of identity did not apply to biographical evidence, such as fingerprint evidence challenged in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 754-55. Rather than apply a broad biographical-information exception to the exclusionary rule, the court addressed the admissibility of the evidence under traditional Fourth Amendment case law. Id. at 755. Specifically, the court determined that, under long-accepted Supreme Court precedent, the exclusionary rule may be applied to fingerprint and other biographical evidence obtained as the result of unlawful arrests and detentions. Id. at 755 (discussing Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985) and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S. Ct. 1394 (1969)).

Coming to the same conclusion, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Lopez-Mendoza and stated that

the Supreme Court’s statement that the ‘body’ or identity of a defendant are ‘never suppressible’ applies only to cases in which the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the court over him or her based upon the unconstitutional arrest, not to cases in which the defendant only challenges the admissibility of the identity-related evidence.

A defendant may still seek suppression of specific pieces of evidence (such as, say, fingerprints or statements) under the ordinary rules announced in [Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961)] and [Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963)]. A broader reading of Lopez-Mendoza would give the police carte blanche powers to engage in any manner of unconstitutional conduct so long as their purpose was limited to establishing a defendant’s identity.

United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006).

We find this authority persuasive, and we conclude that there is no general principle that biographical information is exempt from the exclusionary rule. As such, the district court erred as a matter of law. We hold that when biographical evidence is obtained through unconstitutional governmental action and a party challenges the admissibility of the evidence, the exclusionary rule applies.

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