W.D.Ky.: Unlawful towing of vehicle to install court ordered tracking device did not make tracking device unreasonable

Defendant’s vehicle was unlawfully seized when it was towed, and a court ordered tracking device was installed. The unlawful towing did not make the installation of the court ordered tracking device. United States v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 2d 633 (W.D. Ky. 2009), accepted in part, rejected in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73997 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 2009):

Here, no legitimate noninvestigative purpose existed for the police to remove Defendant Williams’ automobile from the parking lot. The vehicle was lawfully parked and presented no danger to the public, nor was the vehicle itself shown to be at risk. Most importantly, Williams’ wife and her friend, Cherie Liggons, were present and available to drive the vehicle back to Williams’ Apollo Ct. home. Instead of releasing the automobile to the two women, the police had the vehicle towed purely for investigatory purposes so that the permanent electronic tracking device could be surreptitiously installed. Given these circumstances, the warrantless seizure of Williams’ Town Car, while not prohibited in any fashion by the recent Gant decision, was nevertheless an objectively unreasonable warrantless seizure not supported by the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

This conclusion does not mean, however, that the ensuing installation of the tracking device was unlawful. This is so, the Court concludes, because the seizure of the vehicle was an inevitable event. The record is undisputed that Det. Juan Garrett obtained a search warrant from Chief Judge Shake soon after the seizure of the vehicle. The warrant empowered police to lawfully install in the vehicle a hidden electronic tracking device powered by the electrical system of the car. The near-contemporaneous issuance of this warrant rendered the seizure of Williams’ Town Car and implantation of the tracking device, inevitable irrespective of the preceding unlawful seizure.

The situation is analytically similar to the inevitable discovery doctrine under Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984). Under this doctrine, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable, even if the initial search or seizure is unlawful, where the evidence at issue would inevitably been discovered by lawful means. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.”).

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