N.D.Ohio: OFAC block on assets is a seizure

OFAC block on assets is a Fourth Amendment seizure under Soldal. Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009):

A Fourth Amendment seizure, in contrast, does not result in passage of title to the government or even necessarily permanent deprivation. A seizure affects a possessory interest: Id. at 1263. A Fourth Amendment seizure may often lead to permanent deprivation of the property “taken” by government officers, but that is not always so. Indeed, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) provides a means for seeking return of seized property.

Viewing the consequences of a blocking order in a Fourth Amendment light, the court in Al Haramain stated that because “[e]ven a temporary deprivation of property” constitutes a seizure, an OFAC blocking action affects Fourth Amendment rights. Id. If merely “holding luggage for 90 minutes” constitutes a seizure, then surely placing an indefinite freeze on all an entity’s assets is as well. Id.

This conclusion is not only reinforced, but, indeed, made irrefutable on consideration of the fact that the very purpose of an OFAC blocking action is to “depriv[e] the designated person of the benefit of the property, including services, that might otherwise be used to further ends that conflict with U.S. interests.” Al Haramain, supra, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. An OFAC block interferes with possessory rights, and is, in Fourth Amendment terms a seizure.

Defendant’s alleged illegal arrest did not taint his live-in girlfriend’s consent to search their home which was quite independent. United States v. Meece, 580 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2009):

The record in this case supports two theories as to why Lee consented to the search, neither of which helps Meece. Markham testified that when Lee consented to the search, she said that she had children in the house and that she was worried about the guns. Lee’s affidavit and testimony claimed that she consented to the search because she needed to pick up her child from daycare and Markham threatened that if Lee did not consent to the search, the officers would get a warrant, which could take hours, and that, during that time, Lee would not be allowed to leave the house. 2 Lee never even hinted that the news of Meece’s arrest prompted her consent; whether she consented to the search out of a concern for her children’s safety or because she needed to pick up her child from daycare is irrelevant.

Supervised release condition of searches without cause was not facially unconstitutional, and it was within the district court’s discretion. United States v. Camp, 344 Fed. Appx. 431 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished):

Camp contends that the district court erred by imposing a special condition of supervised release requiring him to submit to search or seizure “with or without a warrant and with or without reasonable or probable cause.” This search condition does not facially violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, the record reflects that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the condition in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557-58 (9th Cir. 2006); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 854-55, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006).

Drawing of weapons and use of handcuffs during a Terry stop does not transform it into an arrest. United States v. Jackson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81159 (N.D. Ga. July 30, 2009).*

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