CA7: Exemplifying the low standard of RS: that a citizen informant thought a particular vehicle was involved in shots fired was enough

Information to the police that shots may have been fired was sufficient to justify a stop when another person said he “thought” that the people were in a particular van. The standard is reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. Key here was that the statement came from an identified citizen informant. United States v. Booker, 579 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2009):

Tennin’s statements to police provided the officers with enough information for officers to believe a crime occurred and that Booker may have been involved. First, police received a 911 call reporting gunshot fire. When Officer Presley arrived, Tennin flagged him down, identified himself, and reported a battery that occurred earlier in the evening. Tennin gave the address of where the battery occurred and the area in which he believed he heard the gunshot. He also gave a specific description of a suspect and pointed out Booker’s van as the one that he thought carried the men involved in the battery.

… Tennin was willing to identify himself to police and have officers speak with his daughter, which differentiates him from other anonymous tipsters whose reports may not give rise to reasonable suspicion. …

Whether the officers had reason to believe Booker was the person who committed the crime is a closer call. Tennin originally stated that the men involved in the battery left on foot, but then pointed out Booker’s van as it entered the driveway. Although it is true Tennin said he “thinks” Booker’s maroon van was the van the suspects were in, that conjecture does not necessarily make the statement unreliable. Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause and “‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.'” United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Tennin said the suspects left on foot and that a group of men, not just one man, was involved, but that does not change the fact that Tennin told police that he thought the people involved in the incident were in the van Booker was driving. That Booker’s appearance did not exactly match the description offered by Tennin does not help Booker because Officer Campbell was about 200 feet away from Booker when he stopped the van and could not have seen whether Booker was bald under his cap.

This vehicle search was governed by the automobile exception and not Gant because the officers saw ammunition on the front seat, and that gave PC to look for a gun it would match. United States v. Black, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77111 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2009).*

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