D.D.C.: Strip search of an arrested protester was unreasonable

Strip search of detainees arrested and strip searched for protesting at an IMF meeting in DC stated a claim because the law was well settled because nearly all circuits have held strip searches without cause are unreasonable, and pointing to one case that might “muddy the water” was insufficient to show the law was well settled at the time of the strip search. Bame v. Dillard, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75375 (D. D.C. August 25, 2009):

Until 2008 [sic?], every federal circuit court to have faced the issue (ten out of twelve) ruled that, under Bell, suspicionless strip searches of pre-trial arrestees charged with non-violent, non-drug crimes was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. See Wilson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2001); Swain v. Spiney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1997); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1250 (6th Cir. 1989); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986); Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 616-18 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007,1013 (4th Cir. 1981); but cf. Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.2d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (allowing county jail’s blanket policy of strip searching all arrestees that were detained with the general inmate population). In other words, at the time of the searches at issue here (September 2002), all these courts, some for nearly twenty-five years, required at least reasonable suspicion to strip search a pre-trial or pre-arraignment arrestee charged with a non-violent, non-drug crime.

Defendant’s appeal that district court’s decision was clearly erroneous based on his version of stop having been rejected and having no evidence to support it was frivolous. United States v. Ayala-Cabrera, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 18916 (10th Cir. August 21, 2009) (unpublished).*

A dog alert is PC in the 10th Cir., and the court declines to impose a requirement that there be a “final indication” by the dog. “We hold that probable cause was satisfied by Rico’s alert to [*15] the odor of an illegal substance in the vehicle and that it was not necessary for the dog to indicate the exact source of that odor. Indeed, it might be dangerous to permit a narcotics dog to pinpoint the location of the drugs in certain circumstances, such as here, where the vehicle’s occupants were still inside and the dog was trained to indicate by barking, scratching, and biting at the source of the odor.” United States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2009).*