D.Utah: Stop based on alleged broken taillight lens was invalid and suppressed

Defendant’s stop was without reasonable suspicion. The officer claimed that a cracked taillight with tape on it violated state law, but it did not. This was a mistake of law not fact, and suppression was warranted. United States v. Rosvall, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (D. Utah 2009):

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered such a situation in Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 398. In that case, a Pennsylvania state trooper had stopped the defendant after noticing a necklace or pendant hanging from the rearview mirror of the truck. The trooper later testified that he believed that having “anything” hanging from the rearview mirror violated Pennsylvania law. Id. at 395. But the trooper was wrong. As the court recognized after reviewing the relevant statute, an object hanging from the rearview mirror violated Pennsylvania law only if it was “positioned in such a way as to materially obstruct, obscure or impair the driver’s vision through the front windshield.” Id. at 395 (quotation omitted). In concluding that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, the Third Circuit explained that a “mistake of law is only unreasonable when the officer does not offer facts that objectively show that the identified law was actually broken.” Id. at 399. And because the Pennsylvania trooper had testified that the hanging item was long enough to touch the dashboard and not stationary, more than likely obscuring the driver’s vision, the trooper met his burden. Therefore, the court concluded that the trooper’s mistake of law was not per se unreasonable.

Such is not the case here. Officer Gray failed to provide specific, articulable facts that the condition of the Explorer’s taillight was actually in violation of Utah law. Accordingly, the court concludes that the stop was unreasonable. Cf. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d at 1138 (“[L]egal justification must be objectively grounded.” (quotation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Felty, 443 Pa. Super. 559, 662 A.2d 1102, 1103 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (concluding that “the facts, as found by the suppression court, do not support the conclusion that the police possessed reasonable and articulable grounds to stop [the defendant’s] car”)

Because the government failed to satisfy its burden and demonstrate that the stop was lawful, Mr. Rosvall’s motion is granted.

Defendant at trial denied any knowledge of a weapon found in a crawlspace and disavowed it. Therefore, no privacy interest of his was involved, even under Washington’s automatic standing rule. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 211 P.3d 1055 (July 21, 2009).*

A named Title III interceptee has standing. If someone claims his voice was captured in a wiretap of another, he needs to file an affidavit to that effect to have standing. United States v. Rodriguez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74007 (S.D. N.Y. August 19, 2009).*

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