CA7: Use of a gun during execution of a warrant without justification for nonviolent crime was unreasonable

Wielding a machine gun during execution of a search warrant for a nonviolent crime, without any justification, was unreasonable. Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2009):

Law enforcement is a difficult job, as “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments–in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). This reality is reflected in the fact that courts give considerable leeway to law enforcement officers’ assessments about the appropriate use of force in dangerous situations. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385-86, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). This latitude ends, however, when police officers employ force that is clearly excessive or unreasonable under the circumstances. That is the case here.

Officer John Renbarger participated in the execution of a search warrant that was based on the crime of altering a vehicle identification number (“VIN”). The crime itself does not involve violence; there was no suggestion that anyone at the search location was armed or dangerous; and no one at the site presented any resistance. Despite this, Renbarger decided to wield a 9-millimeter submachine gun, which he used to detain various people at the search site. The search ended when the officers concluded that the VIN had not actually been altered.

Is “reasonable belief” under Steagald to believe a suspect in an arrest warrant is in a third party’s premises PC or something lower? It should be PC, but, whatever it is, the police had it here. United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2009):

Four other circuits have disagreed, holding that “reasonable belief” amounts to the same thing as “probable cause.” See United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 416 n.6 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 501 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995). As Judge Clay explained in a concurring opinion, the Supreme Court tends to use phrases like “reasonable grounds for belief” as “grammatical analogue[s]” for probable cause. United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (Clay, J., concurring) (citing cases). To wit, in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), the Court appears to use “reasonable belief” to define probable cause. Id. at 371 (“[T]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”).

Were we to reach the issue, we might be inclined to adopt the view of the narrow majority of our sister circuits that “reasonable belief” is synonymous with probable cause. However, we need not decide whether “reasonable belief” requires probable cause or something less than probable cause because in the present case the police had enough evidence to easily satisfy a probable cause standard. The police received a tip that Jackson was staying at Joseph’s apartment and that he would be there the following morning. When the police arrived at the apartment, they asked Jackson’s girlfriend if Jackson was inside and she nodded yes and started crying. This was more than enough to lead a prudent person to believe that Jackson was inside the apartment when he or she entered. See Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1995) (defining probable cause as existing when the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in such a belief). Thus, we need not decide whether “reasonable belief” can constitute less than probable cause; the police clearly had probable cause in this case.