E.D.N.Y.: Miranda warnings not required for border crossing questions

Miranda does not apply to questions at the border (here, JFK Customs). United States v. Miller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62396 (E.D. N.Y. July 21, 2009):

Routine questioning by custom officers at border entry points does not constitute custodial interrogation and therefore does not implicate Miranda. United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that questions directed to a person’s citizenship, the length and purpose of her travel, the items she was carrying and what she had to declare were routine questions necessary to protect the nation’s borders and, thus, did not require Miranda warnings). The mere fact that a defendant is not forthcoming with his true pedigree information does not turn a routine admissibility interview into a non-routine interview. See Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[B]order crossers cannot, by their own non-compliance, turn an otherwise routine search into a non-routine one.”). Similarly, the fact that a defendant’s responses may have evidentiary value in the charges against him is, without more, insufficient to trigger a Miranda requirement when the questions answered are part of a routine immigration inquiry. See United States v. Adegbite, 877 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1989) (declining to suppress a defendant’s admission that he was the person named in an arrest warrant, even where the admission would have evidentiary value in the case against him, because the agents were exercising prudence in asking the question before executing the warrant).

Alleged illegal seizure of a notebook by opening it during an alleged illegal administrative search was minimal and impossible to separately award damages for. It is subsumed within the illegal search issue. Elkins v. District of Columbia, 636 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. D.C. 2009).*

Officers who entered after the first officers were entitled to assume that the first officers were there lawfully, relying on Groh. Arias v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61519 (D. Minn. July 17, 2009).*

Search of car was by consent. By the time the officer went under the hood, he had PC. United States v. Cathey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61836 (W.D. Ky. July 10, 2009).*

The actions the officers saw did not amount to reasonable suspicion of criminality. They later learned of some suspicious things, but they didn’t have it when the defendant was stopped and questioned. And, even that was really thin: “simply too innocuous to be of value in ascertaining the propriety of any Terry stop of Rios-Carreon on July 29, 2008.” United States v. Rios-Carreon, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62108 (W.D. Mo. May 26, 2009).*

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