CA7: Repossessor had apparent authority to consent to a search of the car to be repossessed

A repossessor of a car has apparent authority to consent to a search of the car he is repossessing. The question is not whether the repossession is legal; rather, it is whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe that it was. Also, defendant who denied ownership of car before search was held to have no standing to challenge it search. He was a mere passenger anyway. United States v. Alexander, 573 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2009):

Alexander argues that the officers’ reliance on Bowman’s consent was unreasonable because the repossession violated state law. Wisconsin law authorizes a merchant to repossess collateral provided that the merchant does not commit a breach of the peace. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 425.206(2)(a). According to Alexander, the statute prohibits repossession when resistance by the debtor or a third party merely threatens a breach of the peace. For authority he relies on Hollibush v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 179 Wis. 2d 799, 508 N.W.2d 449 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). But Hollibush does not stand for the proposition that the mere fear of resistance by the debtor is a breach of the peace. Instead, Hollibush held that the creditor’s agent breached the peace by repossessing the debtor’s vehicle when the debtor or her fiance told the agent not to repossess the vehicle. Id. at 455. Similarly, the other case relied on by Alexander also involved repossession in the face of the debtor’s objection, which was found to be a breach of the peace. See First & Farmers Bank of Somerset, Inc. v. Henderson, 763 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). Here, neither Fjelstad, Alexander, nor, for that matter, Richmond, objected to the repossession. Besides, the concern here is whether the officers could have reasonably believed that the repossessor had authority to give consent. Evaluation of the reasonableness of their belief in the context of the Fourth Amendment is not dependent on every nuance of Wisconsin repossession law. The facts known by these officers were sufficient to support a reasonable belief that Bowman had such authority.

One does not have a right to a Miranda warning before a taking of a DNA sample. State v. Baldwin, 290 S.W.3d 139 (Mo. App. 2009).*

No IAC for not pursuing a search and seizure claim where defendant lacked standing. In re Pers. Restraint in re Davis, 151 Wn. App. 331, 211 P.3d 1055 (2009).*

The record shows that defendant consented to the search of his bedroom and he voluntarily produced drugs and money. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 2009 PA Super 137, 979 A.2d 879 (2009).*