CA9: Use of tire deflation devices in the desert to stop a fleeing vehicle was valid with RS and was not otherwise unreasonable

Defendant’s vehicle showing up in the desert in a place under surveillance by the Border Patrol, preceded by two ATVs as apparent scout vehicles, was subject to being stopped under the extended border search doctrine. The use of a tire deflation device to stop the vehicle that would not stop was not an arrest. United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cota-Mora, 339 Fed. Appx. 714 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished):

The use of the tire deflation device did not render the attendant stop an “arrest” because the circumstances would not likely have caused a reasonable innocent person to believe that an indefinite custodial detention was inevitable, and because the application of force to the vehicle was justified. See id. Nor did the use of the device amount to excessive force: under the circumstances, any intrusion upon Cota’s rights was outweighed by the government’s interests in protecting its territorial integrity and interdicting the flow of illegal drugs without endangering the motoring public, and there was ample evidence in the district court that the deployment of the device was safe for all involved. See id. In the latter respect, while Cota claims that his vehicle began to swerve after his tires deflated, the record is devoid of any suggestion that this was the case, and is fully consistent with the government’s claim that the stop occurred without the slightest incident.

Defendant’s argument that there was a Franks violation because the officer did not make the hypertechnical argument that the officer omitted information that might be of some pertinence at trial fails. The question is PC for issuing the warrant, and there clearly was. United States v. Alexander, 574 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2009)*:

More fundamentally, however, Alexander’s statutory interpretation argument is beside the point because a magistrate reviewing a warrant application is charged with the duty of determining whether a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Hart, 544 F.3d at 914 (quotation omitted). Indeed, “[i]t is not necessary for an affidavit to include the name of the specific crime alleged.” United States v. Summage, 481 F.3d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 875 (2008). “Rather, only a probability of criminal conduct need be shown.” Id. (quotation omitted). Absent a contrary ruling by a controlling authority, a neutral magistrate could reasonably assume that one does not sacrifice his or her privacy interest to the entire world whenever one permits another to view himself or herself in the nude. Thus, even if Det. Johnson had supplemented the affidavit with the information that Alexander was present in the secretly recorded videos, probable cause would have remained.

Defendant’s knock-and-talk led to a consensual search. United States v. Carter, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61019 (S.D. W.Va. July 13, 2009).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not having forecast that the state supreme court would find a greater right to privacy in a motel register under the state constitution to entitle him to pursue an IAC claim. In re Pers. Restraint of Nichols, 151 Wn. App. 262, 211 P.3d 462 (2009).*