CA9: Forced (and erroneous) taking of DNA from a prison inmate violated the Fourth Amendment, but qualified immunity applied

Forced taking of DNA from a prison inmate violated his Fourth Amendment rights because his offense was not a qualifying offense under California law, but defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Koch v. Lockyer, 340 Fed. Appx. 372 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished):

Prisoners have diminished privacy rights, and as such, limited freedom against searches and seizures of their body, including the collection of their DNA. Cf. United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007). However, even the limited security right Koch had against forcible extraction of his DNA outweighs the government’s interest in obtaining his DNA, since the state legislature had not expressed such an interest at the time his DNA was collected. Cf. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 & n.39 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding compulsory DNA collection from certain federal violent criminal offenders in absence of individualized suspicion that they had committed additional crimes, where the legislature expressed a legitimate governmental interest in that DNA collection and “the evenhandedness of [the] statute contribute[d] to its reasonableness” (quoting Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1561 (9th Cir. 1995)).

In this case, given the absence of individualized suspicion, probable cause, a legislative act endorsing this type of DNA collection, or “special needs” to justify that collection, Appellees’ forcible collection of Koch’s DNA was unreasonable. Cf. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (holding that “the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). Therefore, Appellees violated Koch’s Fourth Amendment rights by forcibly taking his DNA under these circumstances.

Finding that a stolen vehicle report had been recalled after the vehicle was found did not require exclusion. This is similar in effect to Herring. The stolen vehicle report justified seizure of the vehicle, and a search of the vehicle located a bomb. United States v. Noster, 573 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2009):

Like the arresting officers in Hensley, there is no dispute that Officers Capa and Murphy acted in reasonable reliance on the stolen vehicle database to conclude that the car was stolen and thus “seizable” pursuant to California law. See Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(c) (providing that an officer may remove a vehicle from a public street where “a report has previously been made that the vehicle has been stolen”). Moreover, because we impute Officer Beene’s probable cause to believe that the vehicle was evidence of criminal fraud to the two officers, see Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233, their seizure and search of the truck was also reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. …

“Although Officer Tully thereafter immediately began to question Muniz to ‘take consent or develop reasonable suspicion,’ this follow-on questioning did not change the consensual encounter into an illegal detention. The district court did not clearly err in its determination that the post-Terry-stop questioning was a consensual encounter.” United States v. Muniz, 340 Fed. Appx. 193 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s probation search was justified by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Boynton, 337 Fed. Appx. 801 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

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