KA: Neither PC nor nexus required for search of a parolee’s home

While the police were only able to corroborate innocent details from the CI, there were sufficient details to show RS. Here, the police had more corroboration than in White. People v. Payne, 393 Ill. App. 3d 175, 912 N.E.2d 301, 332 Ill. Dec. 115 (2009)*:

The facts of this case are even stronger than the facts in White because in this case, the police knew the informant’s identity and knew that he had provided them with reliable information the day before. Further, the facts of this case are remarkably similar to the facts in both Gates and Draper, in which the stricter probable cause standard was necessary in order to defeat the defendants’ motions to suppress. Certainly, considering the totality of the circumstances and the lower level of suspicion necessary to perform a Terry stop, the State sufficiently established that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to make the initial investigatory stop.

Generally, a warrant based on probable cause is required to search a person’s home, and probable cause requires some nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the place to be searched. However, this nexus requirement does not apply to the search of a parolee’s home when the parole officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee has violated a condition of his or her release and the parolee has been informed that he or she is subject to property searches based on reasonable suspicion of a parole violation. The degree of reliability necessary to support a parole search based on reasonable suspicion of a parole violation, like the parolee’s expectation of privacy, is greatly diminished. State v. Haffner, 42 Kan. App. 2d 205, 209 P.3d 734 (Kan. App. 2009).

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