CA8: Miranda violation does not warrant suppression of physical evidence

Statements made allegedly in violation of Miranda during a traffic stop were admissible under Berkemer. Even so, a Miranda violation does not always lead to suppression of physical evidence. United States v. Morse, 569 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2009):

On appeal, the government argues that the district court erred in suppressing Morse’s statements and the crack cocaine based on Miranda, and we agree. In Berkemer, the Supreme Court held that even though a motorist is seized during a traffic stop, 468 U.S. at 436-37, Miranda warnings are not required where the motorist is not subjected to the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Id. at 440-42. Therefore, that Morse reasonably believed that he was not free to terminate the encounter with Baggett does not resolve whether Miranda warnings were required in order to elicit admissible statements from Morse. See United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the “broad contention that a person is in custody for Miranda purposes whenever a reasonable person would not feel free to leave”). The district court thought Berkemer was distinguishable based on the nature of Baggett’s question to Morse, but we held in United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005), that Miranda warnings were not required when a police officer asked a motorist during a traffic stop virtually the same question asked of Morse: whether there was “anything in the vehicle that [the officer] should know about.” Id. at 1000. Like the motorist in Martin, Morse was never “‘informed that his detention would not be temporary,’ and he was asked only a ‘modest number of questions.'” Id. at 1003 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442). In short, Morse was [*5] not subjected to the functional equivalent of a formal arrest before Baggett made his inquiry, and Miranda warnings were therefore not required. Id.

In addition, the parties agree that the court’s rationale for suppression of the drugs is incorrect in light of United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). In Patane, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Miranda rule does not justify the suppression of non-testimonial physical evidence that is the fruit of custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings. Id. at 642-44 (plurality opinion); id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, even if Baggett had been required to administer Miranda warnings before questioning Morse in order to elicit admissible statements, the physical evidence recovered from Morse’s pocket based on his unwarned statements should not be suppressed under the Miranda rule.

Defendant had no standing in a hidden compartment in a vessel which was not his sleeping compartment. United States v. Amaro-Rodriguez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53989 (D. P.R. June 25, 2009).*

CI’s previous history of 8 search warrants on his information showed him believable. United States v. Harris, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53797 (E.D. Tenn. June 25, 2009).*

“No, no but can I look when you look? I just want to be right there, you can put the hand cuffs on me and everything, just let me be right there” is consent. United States v. Hill, 334 Fed. Appx. 640 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*