CA10: GFE first, and PC does not have to be resolved

There was PC for a child pornography search of defendant’s computer. The affidavit was supported by the officer’s factual testimony linking defendant’s internet protocol address with two separate offerings of unlawful files containing a digital signature identified with 99.99% certainty. As for the GFE, nothing in the record indicated that the agent would have had any reason to believe the affidavit was constitutionally infirm or even questionable. United States v. Harrison, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 12071 (10th Cir. June 4, 2009)*:

“It is only when [an executing officer’s] reliance was wholly unwarranted that good faith is absent.” Cardall, 773 F.2d at 1133 (emphasis added); United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 409 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding officers’ reliance on warrant was objectively reasonable because warrant affidavit was not devoid of facts); United States v. Wright, 791 F.2d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding that where the affidavit was not “devoid of factual support,” officers who executed the search warrant were “entitled to rely in good faith upon the decision of that magistrate as provided in Leon and Cardall.”); see also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (“[S]ince Leon, we have never applied the [exclusionary] rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was [merely negligent].”).

Cell phone found in a stopped car was admissible either under search incident [relying on Belton and not Gant because this case was decided 18 days before Gant] because the defendant was just in the car and because there was PC for a search of the car. United States v. Florence, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46827 (E.D. Pa. April 3, 2009).*

Defendant exited freeway at a ruse checkpoint sign and went into a rest area and stopped. He was approached by an unarmed plain clothes officer who asked questions. He was not seized and voluntarily answered questions which led to his consent. State v. Hedgcock, 277 Neb. 805, 2009 Neb. LEXIS 83 (May 22, 2009).*

Accepting an air quality permit in New Mexico was a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights to the extent the permit holder had to permit air quality inspectors into the mine and plant area. (This case also has an extensive discussion of searches and the administrative exception.) Copar Pumice Co. v. Morris, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. N.M. 2008):

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Brown is instructive. By accepting the benefits of the Air Quality permit, Copar Pumice knowingly and voluntarily consented to NMED’s right of entry to the facility “at all reasonable times to verify the terms and conditions” of the permit, and upon request, to production of “any records or information necessary to establish” compliance with the terms and conditions of the permit. Air Quality Permit at 8. Similar to the government’s interest in United States v. Brown, New Mexico has a substantial interest in protecting the environment and the public from air pollution, and in establishing effective methods to monitor compliance with state air quality standards. Copar Pumice freely accepted the terms and conditions of its permit, and was aware of the inspection, recordkeeping, and monitoring provisions. Copar Pumice effectively, knowingly, and voluntarily waived its Fourth Amendment rights to searches conducted in compliance with the permit and the statute.