CT: Minor in danger inside was justification for a warrantless entry

A claim that a minor in the house was in imminent danger was justification for an emergency entry. (n.1: A state search and seizure constitutional claim has to be separately analyzed. [It would have lost on these facts anyway.]) State v. Ryder, 114 Conn. App. 528, 969 A.2d 818 (2009)*:

We hasten to add that “this limited privilege to investigate emergencies without a search warrant is subject to judicial scrutiny. … The reasonableness of police activity must always pass judicial muster according to objective, empirical criteria before the court.” (Citation omitted.) People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 179, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (cited with approval in State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 143, 864 A.2d 666 [2004], cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 [2005]), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S. Ct. 3178, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1191 (1976). That being said, in light of the facts found by the court, we agree that, on the basis of what Officer Kelly knew at the time he entered the defendant’s home, he had a reasonable belief that a minor was in imminent danger inside the house. As such, the entry was reasonable, and the defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated.

Defendant had no privacy interest in a box stopped for a look in a DHL facility. Also, RS is not the standard for stopping a box. State v. Garrison, 2009 Ariz. App. LEXIS 136 (May 9, 2009).*

The officers acted reasonably in conducting a protective sweep, considering the risk there was an armed person inside. State v. Lee, 320 Wis. 2d 536, 771 N.W.2d 373 (2009):

P16 The officers were faced with a Hobson’s choice if they did not enter the apartment to perform a protective sweep. If they waited on the landing and guarded the drugs for the time necessary to obtain a warrant, they may have found themselves in grave danger. If they retreated in an attempt to avoid the potential danger, an occupant would likely destroy the evidence. Nothing in the record suggests that the amount of drugs the officers saw through the open door was too voluminous to be easily disposed of, and Lee does not argue to the contrary. Moreover, retreating would not necessarily obviate the potential risk to the officer’s safety during the time it took to decide to return down the stairs and then to do so. We conclude that articulable facts exist to demonstrate that the officers had reasonable suspicion that individuals may be hiding in the apartment who would pose a danger to them, and that a warrantless entry into the apartment for purposes of conducting a protective sweep of the apartment was justified.

. . .

P19 As we discuss above, the officers in the present case found themselves in the middle of an unstable situation–having to decide whether to stand guard over the open door to an apartment potentially occupied by armed individuals prepared to attack them while they took the time necessary to obtain a warrant, or instead to retreat and risk the destruction of the evidence, along with a continuing risk of attack. These circumstances posed the sort of special risks that did not exist in Kiekhefer which required the officers to act immediately and to forego obtaining a warrant.