S.D.W.Va.: NCIC report was too vague to support arrest, and the exclusionary rule had to apply because officers were reckless under Herring

Defendant’s arrest was without probable cause and a warrant off a vague NCIC printout, and the court concludes that the arrest has to be suppressed under Herring because the officers were not acting in objective good faith in relying on the vague report as proof of an arrest warrant. United States v. Toledo, 615 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D. W.Va. 2009):

As stated, this Court must be guided by an analysis of the ability to deter Fourth Amendment violations and the culpability of law enforcement officers. This analysis is “objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers.” Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. Here, “‘a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.'” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.)) The actions of Lt. Smith and Sgt. Westfall are a far cry from those of the sheriff’s department personnel in Herring. In this case, there was no warrant that gave these officers authority to arrest Defendant; rather, they presumed such authority despite receiving contrary information. They were not merely negligent, but rather “reckless[] or grossly negligent.” Id. at 702. Such conduct can, and should be, deterred. To this end, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that this case involved good faith, mistaken but objectively reasonable, reliance on an invalid warrant.

Extreme nervousness was a strong factor in RS because it continued after the officer told the defendant he was giving a warning ticket. Dog alert supported search of the trunk. Yoeuth v. State, 2009 WY 61, 206 P.3d 1278 (2009).*

Officer was called when defendant complained that his girlfriend would not leave his apartment. When the officer got there, the girlfriend told him that the defendant had a crackpipe in his headboard. She did not have apparent authority to consent to the search because it was obvious that she did not live there. State v. Williams, 2009 Ohio 2040, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1699 (8th Dist. April 30, 2009).*

Officer saw defendant’s van pull into a driveway in a high crime area, and a person known to be a drug dealer came out and reached into the driver’s window, leading the officer to suspect a hand-to-hand drug transaction. He saw nothing change hands. He followed the vehicle and pulled it over. When the defendant stopped at a convenience store, the officer stopped him and asked for permission to search his person, which he got, finding nothing. The officer asked the passenger who was the vehicle owner, and he declined to consent to a search of the vehicle, so the officer called for a drug dog. The detention was without reasonable suspicion. Panter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. App. 1DCA 2009).*

Defendant parolee was ratted out by his girlfriend to his parole officer about his possession of drugs, and that justified the parole search of his house. United States v. Noble, 326 Fed. Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Defendant complained that the stop took too long for the drug dog to arrive. His admission that somebody smoked marijuana in the car that day “was additional reason to prolong the stop to allow the dog sniff.” United States v. Johnson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10072 (7th Cir. May 11, 2009) (unpublished).*

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