CA8: Smell of working meth law was exigent circumstance

CI told police about defendant’s meth lab at home. Police went there without a warrant and could smell it from outside. They had PC and exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry. United States v. Clarke, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9913 (8th Cir. May 8, 2009):

Exigent circumstances also existed. Because the officers had probable cause to believe methamphetamine was being produced in Clarke’s home, the officers reasonably concluded there was a potential threat to the safety of the officers, anybody inside the home, and anyone in the surrounding area. See United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002) (declaring, “[o]ur court has consistently considered safety factors in determining whether exigent circumstances existed,” and “[t]he potential hazards of methamphetamine manufacture are well documented, and numerous cases have upheld limited warrantless searches by police officers who had probable cause to believe they had uncovered an on-going methamphetamine manufacturing operation”). The officers’ concern for the safety of everyone involved in the situation was reasonably heightened after the officers were unable to contact anyone inside the home after knocking and calling the listed telephone number. See id. (holding exigent circumstances existed when there was an odor of ether, possible equipment for methamphetamine manufacturing, and the officers could not determine whether anyone was hiding or lying unconscious, or whether there was a dangerous heat source, in the suspected methamphetamine lab). We therefore conclude the district court did not commit error in denying Clarke’s motion to suppress because the warrantless entry of Clarke’s home on August 23, 2005, was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances.

Consent was shown to be voluntary under the totality [without saying what it was]. United States v. Ramirez, 326 Fed. Appx. 182 (4th Cir. 2009)* (unpublished).

Defendant’s father had apparent authority to consent to a search of the family computer for which he paid the internet access. United States v. Mullen, 329 Fed. Appx. 61 (9th Cir. 2009)* (unpublished):

Here, Mullen’s father had actual authority to consent to the search of the computer he purchased for his family’s use, located in an unoccupied room, and for which he paid for the internet access. See United States v. Dearing, 9 F.3d 1428, 1429 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court’s determination that Mullen’s father’s consent was voluntary was not clearly erroneous where the officers were dressed in plain clothes and never showed their guns as a display of authority. See United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, Mullen’s father signed a consent form which clearly informed him of his right to choose not to consent.

Defendant was not told he was free to leave during traffic stop, but he should have known he was when the ticket for speeding was given. Consent was asked for while defendant was still there. United States v. Zambrano, 325 Fed. Appx. 369 (5th Cir. 2009)* (unpublished) [Note: I never buy that the defendant should have known he was free to leave until he is specifically told he was free to leave. He was stopped with flashing lights of the police car parked behind him, and the lights are not just there for safety purposes for the cars on the side of the road–that was how the officer effected and continues the stop.]