D. Minn.: A second stop is not per se a seizure

First stop was on a bus, and a second stop occurred. The second stop is not per se an unreasonable seizure. United States v. Richards, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35549 (D. Minn. April 23, 2009):

The mere fact that a law enforcement officer initiates a second encounter with a defendant after the initial encounter had been terminated, does not in itself render the second encounter a seizure. See United States v. Mendieta-Garza, 254 F. App’x 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding, in a bus interdiction case, that the fact that a law enforcement officer initiated a second encounter after a first encounter had been terminated did not in itself necessitate a finding that the second encounter constituted a seizure); United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a second encounter with an officer did not result in a seizure when the first encounter, a traffic stop, had ended and the officer had returned all of the defendant’s documents); see also United States v. Esparaza-Mendoza, 386 F.3d 953, 958-59 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that an officer’s making of a second request for identification does not, by itself, implicate the Fourth Amendment). Rather, determining if a seizure has occurred requires considering whether, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

On a motion for return of property under Rule 41(g), the search warrant in this case was sufficiently particular. As to the deprivation of records, the government assured at the TRO hearing that copies of all records would be supplied to conduct the business. So the motion is denied. In re Search of Tobaccoville USA, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35336 (D. S.C. April 10, 2009).*

During the traffic stop, the officer told that he was not issuing a ticket and the defendant could go, but the officer waited a few seconds and then asked if he could ask some questions, and that led to the defendant signing a consent form in Spanish. The defendant consented. United States v. Mendez-Cejas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34824 (D. Nev. January 15, 2009).*

To the same effect as United States v. Pedraza-Bucio, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35367 (D. Utah April 23, 2009), where the stop was 15-20 minutes and a dog inspected the car during the process which did not extend it. The defendant was also found to have sufficient familiarity with English to understand to consent.