N.D. Ill.: Threat to get SW had a reasonable basis

Consent obtained after threat to get a search warrant was still voluntary where there was a basis for concluding there was probable cause. United States v. Chavez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34217 (N.D. Ill. April 23, 2009):

. . . To determine whether a “threat” to obtain a search warrant is baseless, the reviewing court is not, contrary to Chavez’s assertions, required to determine whether probable cause actually existed at the time of the consent. Rather, in order to “know whether the statement was baseless or not,” the court must determine “whether there was probable cause (or a reasonable factual basis to believe there was probable cause).” United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis supplied). The court announced this standard to avoid a situation where the officer seeking consent relies solely on the representations of another officer that probable cause is present, thus creating a “clean heart, empty head” loophole where the individual officer acts with a good faith belief that probable cause exists even where it does not. Id. at 572. Hicks holds that the officer seeking consent must have more than a good faith belief that he would obtain a search warrant; instead, he must have a reasonable factual basis to believe that probable cause exists–a standard more stringent than mere good faith, but less stringent than a determination that probable cause in fact existed. See id. So while the court has little trouble concluding that Agent Wood honestly believed that he could obtain a search warrant for Chavez’s residence, the court must also determine whether a reasonable factual basis existed that would support Wood’s honest belief.

The court concludes that such a reasonable factual basis existed. …

Defendant’s presence in a high-crime area, his known gang affiliation, past criminal conduct, proclivity to carry a firearm, and probationary status were sufficient in totality to establish the reasonable suspicion. CI was discounted. When confronted by the officers, defendant’s hand was thrust into his pocket and that justified his patdown. United States v. Samnang Am, 564 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2009).*

Officer had reasonable supsicion for a patdown: “Camacho’s unusual positioning of his hands in front of his waist in an apparent attempt to shield his groin area could have reasonably been interpreted by an officer with Sousa’s experience as a defensive posture foreshadowing an armed attack.” “I conclude that suppression of the gun is neither called for nor appropriate. I do so for the following reason. The gun was seized only after Camacho shoved Sousa and only after the officers succeeded in wrestling Camacho to the ground and placing him under arrest. The acts of shoving Officer Sousa and resisting arrest were intervening crimes giving the officers independent grounds to arrest Camacho.” United States v. Camacho, 608 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D. Mass. 2009).*

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