D.Minn.: Routine searches of disabled students violated Fourth Amendment

Disabled students were unconstitutionally searched when they came to school everyday, but the special situation leads to qualified immunity. Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Schools, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (D. Minn. 2009):

As discussed above, the undisputed facts establish that MRVSEC violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches. But the Court does not believe that the law with respect to school searches was so unequivocal that the searches were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established legal principles.

Under Doe, suspicionless searches like those challenged in this case are plainly unconstitutional in the ordinary school setting. But MRVSEC programs are not ordinary school settings; they serve only special-education students, and those students receive services that are not provided — or are provided to only a small minority of students — in ordinary schools. In C.N.H. v. Florida, discussed above, suspicionless searches like those challenged in this case were upheld in the context of an “alternative school” for students who would otherwise have been confined. 927 So. 2d at 2. While the Court finds C.N.H. distinguishable, C.N.H. does provide some support for plaintiffs’ position that the challenged MRVSEC searches were constitutional. Under the circumstances of this case, it was not objectively unreasonable — although it was incorrect — for defendants to conclude that sufficient special circumstances existed to justify MRVSEC’s search policy under the Fourth Amendment.

[This case relies on one of ours: Doe v. Little Rock School District, 380 F.3d 349 (8th Cir. 2004).]

Defendant’s Miranda violation does not mandate suppression of the evidence found in a search warrant based on the statement under Patane. There was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26129 (D. Neb. January 6, 2009)*:

Using statements to obtain a search warrant does not compel the defendant to testify against himself at trial; therefore, under Patane, the Miranda violation does not require the suppression of evidence found pursuant to the warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Knill, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47327, 2007 WL 1892560 at *5 n.17, Case No. 07-0029, (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2007); United States v. Phillips, 468 F.3d 1264, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1312, 127 S. Ct. 1893, 167 L. Ed. 2d 377 (2007); United States v. Lara-Garcia, 478 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 948, 127 S. Ct. 2281, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (2007).