S.D.Tex.: “Mere evidence” that was potential 404(b) evidence could be seized under SW

Prosecutor who used a search warrant to aid the defense of a habeas corpus was not entitled to absolute immunity. Auguste v. Sullivan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23526 (D. Colo. March 26, 2009)*:

It is clear that the facts of this case are a significant step removed from the framework laid out in Imbler and its progeny. The facts here involve the execution of a search warrant to aid the defense of a habeas corpus proceeding. “Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and the burden is upon the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief.” Beeler v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 783, 783 (10th Cir. 1964); see also Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978) (“It is well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.”); In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106, 1112 (Cal. 2003) (“Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature.”) (citations omitted). Neither the initiation of a criminal prosecution nor the presentation of the government’s criminal charges is at issue in the present case.

Turning to defendant Wilson’s arguments, I conclude that he fails to meet his burden of showing that the use of search warrants in the defense of Mr. Auguste’s habeas proceeding — a suspect exercise of the search warrant power — justifies the protection of absolute immunity. First, the Court has already determined that defendant Field is not entitled to absolute immunity; therefore, Wilson cannot piggyback on Field’s absolute prosecutorial immunity. Second, Wilson relies on authorities involving pending prosecutions, rather than any case where an investigator was held absolutely immune in connection with a habeas corpus proceeding.

Mere evidence that was seized and could be used as potential 404(b) evidence was properly seized (whether it will be used for that remains to be seen). What was seized was arguably within the search warrant, although not the specific focus of the investigation. United States v. Pena, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23437 (S.D. Tex. March 20, 2009):

Where a search warrant authorizes the seizure of “evidence” of certain identified crimes, the Court determines whether there was cause for the law enforcement officials executing the warrant to believe that the particular item of evidence “will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.” See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). Items that are evidence of similar acts can be seized if they are relevant to an issue such as intent or knowledge. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.