D.Md.: Pretextual stop argument sufficient when officer cannot remember the traffic offense he stopped defendant for

Defendant prevailed on his argument of pretext because the officer could not remember the traffic offense he stopped defendant for. United States v. Burke, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19591 (D. Md. March 10, 2009):

The evidence at the hearing established that Detective Blasko did not remember the basis for the traffic stop, and there were no contemporaneous documents created that memorialized the reason why Defendant’s car was stopped. The best that Det. Blasko could do was make a blanket statement that his regular practice when following a suspicious vehicle was to wait until the vehicle committed a traffic violation, and that he never pulled vehicles over without probable cause. Essentially, Det. Blasko was asking the Court to simply “trust him” and take him at his word that he would not have stopped the car if he had not observed a traffic violation. This is simply an insufficient legal basis upon which to uphold a traffic stop. A finding of probable cause must be based on articulated facts supporting that conclusion.

Defendant was a shooting victim in a robbery attempt and he fled to his cousin’s apartment. The NYPD was called to investigate, and paramedics arrived. His pants were cut off him and left behind. Defendant had no standing in his cousin’s apartment to challenge the search that produced the clothing. There was also third party consent. United States v. Davis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19401 (S.D. N.Y. March 11, 2009).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion to bring out the drug dog during a traffic stop. United States v. $59,502,00 in United States Funds, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18591 (M.D. Ga. March 5, 2009).*

A private search of a motel room by the motel manager who thought that the room had been vacated but found a backpack with drugs in it was merely retraced by the police and was lawful. United States v. Spicer, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18816 (S.D. Ohio February 25, 2009):

Irrespective of the conflicts in the testimony, and taking Spicer’s testimony as true, the Detectives were allowed to retrace the steps of the private search. Even if the Detectives unzipped the book bag, they were merely looking at the same materials examined by the private parties. Detectives opening a book bag that had previously been opened in a private search is absolutely no different than a police officer opening a drawer that had previously been opened in a private search. See Clutter, 914 F.2d at 779. They learned nothing as the result of their own conduct that they had not already heard about as the result of the private search; rather, they “only confirmed the fruits of their private search.” Id. They then obtained a search warrant based on the information provided by the private search, which they had confirmed. After obtaining this warrant, they were justified in expanding their search and seizing items in the hotel room. Therefore, Spicer’s constitutional rights were not violated by the Detectives’ search of the hotel room, prior to obtaining a search warrant.