M.D. Fla.: SW was issued without PC but good faith exception saved it

SD discusses how AguilarSpinelli is no longer the law under Gates, and it finds in this case that corroboration of innocent details can establish the veracity of the informant’s tale. State v. Gilmore, 2009 SD 11, 2009 S.D. LEXIS 11 (February 25, 2009):

[*P24] In Raveydts, we borrowed language from Gates in identifying two elements crucial to the probable cause inquiry when an informant’s tip was involved. 2004 SD 134, P 11, 691 NW2d at 295. “First, an ‘explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles [the informant’s] tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.'” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 US at 234, 103 SCt at 2330). “Second, the extent to which the tip is corroborated by the officer’s own investigation is important.” Id. P 12 (citing Gates, 462 US at 244, 103 SCt at 2335). Both of these elements are met here. As mentioned before, the tip was explicit, detailed, and witnessed firsthand. Therefore, any deficiency in the “veracity” prong is compensated by the strong firsthand knowledge of the CI. Secondly, there was sufficient corroboration of the information by law enforcement thereby ensuring its reliability. Therefore, under our deferential standard of review, Judge Neiles’s determination was appropriate.

While the search was without probable cause, the good faith exception saved it from suppression. United States v. Gainer, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (M.D. Fla. 2009):

This Court’s determination that there was not probable cause justifying the warrant and search of the Anchor Road residence does not, however, end the inquiry. The question remains whether the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. If it does, the evidence should not be suppressed even though the warrant was issued without probable cause. Of the four situations in which the good faith exception does not apply, only two are relevant in this case–whether the magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral role, and whether the warrant was based on an affidavit that was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.

The first of these considerations requires little discussion. While it is this Court’s belief that few magistrates would have issued a warrant based on Officer Scammell’s affidavit, there is no evidence that the decision was the result of bias in favor of law enforcement as opposed to simply not viewing this request separately from the other two applications for warrants, both of which were based in part on observations of law enforcement officers. Moreover, by the time the magistrate signed the warrant, he knew Defendant sold cocaine at one location and lived at another. While the facts were not sufficient to constitute probable cause, it made sense that Defendant might have taken proceeds from cocaine sales to his home. There is no evidence supporting a conclusion that the magistrate wholly abandoned his neutral role.

The remaining and most difficult question in the good faith analysis is whether the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. This question is answered in the negative. By the time the officers presented the Anchor Road affidavit to the magistrate, they had observed two controlled purchases of cocaine from Unit A. They also were convinced, based on what they had been told, that Defendant had been engaged in the sale of cocaine for a significant time. Based on their investigation, the officers believed that Defendant had a habit of leaving Unit A where he daily engaged in the sale of cocaine and returning to his Anchor Road residence. Having this information, it was not objectively unreasonable for the officers to believe that there existed a fair probability that the proceeds from illegal drug sales were located in Defendant’s residence.

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the search of Defendant’s residence on Anchor Road, requiring that the Motion to Suppress the evidence found there be denied.

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