OR: Armed fugitive justified protective sweep of premises where defendant was stopped outside with RS

Entry for protective sweep was justified by fear that there were armed fugitives inside, and getting a warrant was no option. State v. Guggenmos, 225 Ore. App. 641, 202 P.3d 892 (2009):

However, securing the premises and obtaining a warrant was not a reasonable option in this situation, because the third officer, Morrison, remained inside the house with Tidwell. Mogle explained that he “went back upstairs to clear the upstairs because my other officer was up there by himself.” Thus, Mogle had to reenter the house and check the upstairs rooms–without delay–in order to prevent what he reasonably (but, in the event, wrongly) perceived as an immediate threat to Morrison from named persons whom he knew to be wanted individuals involved with drugs. An officer safety sweep is justified not only by immediate danger to the officer, but to others as well. Bates, 304 Ore at 524. Perhaps Mogle could have reentered, explained the situation to Morrison, accompanied Morrison and Tidwell outside, and then attempted to obtain a warrant. His decision to sweep the house himself, however, was the sort of judgment that we are reluctant “to uncharitably second-guess.” Id. We therefore conclude that Mogle’s reentry and cursory search were justified as an officer safety precaution. He was therefore lawfully present in (or at the threshold of) defendant’s room when he saw the disputed evidence in plain view. The police did not exploit information obtained during an unlawful search in order to obtain defendant’s consent to conduct the follow-up search, and, in any event, that search did not lead to any additional evidence. The court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

While there was no break between “you’re free to go” and questions about consent, all the other factors weighed in favor of the defendant being objectively free to go. State v. Bretches, 225 Ore. App. 602, 202 P.3d 883 (2009).*

Man armed with a crossbow in a car videotaping prison buses outside prison wall near a tower was reasonably suspected of planning a prison break, and that justified his detention. United States v. Rochelle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10875 (M.D. N.C. February 12, 2009):

Upon seeing Rochelle with the video-camera, walkie-talkie, and crossbow, Allen was concerned for the safety of the guards in the towers as well as those facilitating the prison transfer. He was also concerned that, given these items and the proximity to the prison transfer location, Rochelle could be facilitating a possible prison break or assault on persons in DOC custody. Allen was particularly worried because a crossbow was a weapon that would not produce any report when fired.

Defendant’s prior giving of DNA on incarceration linked him to a rape, and the use of that evidence did not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Gaines, 2009 Ohio 622, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 540 (8th Dist. February 12, 2009).*