FL2: Triggering event not required in anticipatory warrant if it occurs before search

Trial court erred in suppressing a search under Grubbs and the good faith exception. While the warrant did not list the triggering condition, it was not executed until the triggering condition occurred. “[I]t is evident that delivery of the marijuana was the triggering condition.” State v. Chen, 1 So. 3d 1257 (Fla. App. 2DCA 2009).

In a brief unpublished opinion, the Eighth Circuit finds no clear error in the trial court’s holding a stop was valid, and, in any event, consent purged the taint. [I hope the parties get this, because I don’t.] United States v. Nunez, 310 Fed. Appx. 53 (8th Cir. 2009).*

A single instance of crossing the fog line justifies a stop under Kansas law, and the record supports the conclusion that defendant consented to a search after the stop, despite his asserted language difficulties. United States v. Pulido-Vasquez, 311 Fed. Appx. 140 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s claim he was too intoxicated on Xanax to effectively consent was rejected. [He was also sentenced to 960 months as an armed career offender.] United States v. Kellogg, 306 Fed. Appx. 916 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Possession of a large quantity of PMB was PC to believe defendant was making PCP. “Specifically, the officers could reasonably infer that Cruikshank, who had no apparent legitimate use for large quantities of PMB, who had received PMB from a company linked to PCP laboratory operators, and who sold some of it to Byrd on the street for cash, knowingly possessed the PMB with reason to believe it would be used to make PCP.” United States v. Cruikshank, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2580 (9th Cir. February 6, 2009).*

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