MN: Landlord’s complaints of high traffic to an apartment was RS for a dog sniff in the common hallway

Under Minnesota’s rule that a drug dog in a common hallway requires reasonable suspicion, an apartment manager’s report of “high” traffic to an apartment was sufficient, considering the admittedly low standard of reasonable suspicion. State v. Baumann, 759 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. App. 2009):

Here, a property manager thought that the level of short-term traffic coming to and leaving from Baumann’s apartment was odd and suspicious. Inferentially, the manager of an apartment complex would have some degree of duty to be concerned about the use of the property since illegal activities on the premises could be problematic for the property owner and perhaps jeopardize rentals. So, the manager reported the facts she observed to a narcotics investigator. Although neither the manager nor Detective Buetow determined how many people would constitute a “high amount” or a “high volume,” or what length of time amounted to “short term” or a “short amount of time,” these characterizations were expressions of activities and circumstances the manager actually observed. From those reported facts, Detective Buetow, a trained narcotics investigator, drew an inference that there might be illegal drug activity occurring in the Baumann apartment, and he arranged to confirm the inference through a dog-sniff search.

Acknowledging, as we must, the low threshold the courts have set for reasonable suspicion, we conclude that the information Detective Buetow relied upon as the basis for his suspicion was “something more” than an unarticulated hunch and that he was able to point to “something” that “objectively” supported his suspicion. See Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182.

A particular housing project was known to be a high crime area, and that contributed to reasonable suspicion. It had even been found a high crime area in other cases. United States v. Moore, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107047 (E.D. Tenn. October 10, 2008):

An area’s high crime rate can also contribute to reasonable suspicion. An individual’s presence in an area of frequent criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). “But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” United States v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Officers Roncska and Wallace have both testified to the frequency of violent crime and drug-related crime in the [project], and Officer Wallace testified regarding his particular experience with violent and drug related class in the area. In addition, numerous cases that originated in this District have recognized the high rate of crime in the [project]. See United States v. Muckle, 2008 WL 400444, at *2 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting officer’s testimony that [this project] is a high crime area); United States v. McCreary-Redd, 475 F.3d 718, 720 (6th Cir. 2007) (describing Knoxville Police Department surveillance of the housing project due to complaints of drug activity). The Court finds that the stop was made in a high crime area but reiterates that this factor must be coupled with additional evidence of the circumstances to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.