CA11: Government showed the “well-trained” dog under Caballes

The government showed that the dog in this case was “well-trained” as required by Caballes. United States v. Nelson, 309 Fed. Appx. 373 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished):

A dog sniff must be sufficiently reliable in order to establish probable cause, and this reliability is generally present if the dog is “well-trained.” Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005); United States v. Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834, 838 n.8 (11th Cir. 1982). Evidence of a dog’s training is sufficient proof of reliability. Sentovich, 677 F.2d at 838 n.8. In Sentovich, we rejected the appellant’s argument that “a mere statement that the dog had been trained in drug detection was not enough without an accompanying statement that the dog had proved reliable in the past and that an experienced handler was with the dog,” and approved the reasoning of the First and Tenth Circuits that evidence of a dog’s training is sufficient. Id.

In this case, the evidence regarding the dog’s training went beyond a “mere statement” and included certification from a training school, an officer’s testimony about subsequent training and his records of the dog’s performance, and the testimony of the officer that he was familiar with the dog’s reactions because of their prior training together. See Sentovich, 677 F.2d at 838 n.8. The district court found the officer’s testimony and records about his training credible, and this Court gives great deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. Clay, 376 F.3d at 1302. Based on the evidence presented during the hearing, the district court did not err when it denied Nelson’s motion to suppress on the ground the dog was reliable and its response provided the officers with probable cause to search the car.

Traffic offense justified stop, and smell of marijuana provided probable cause. United States v. Davis, 308 Fed. Appx. 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Affidavit for thermal imaging warrant showed probable cause. United States v. Kattaria, 553 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (en banc).*

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