GA: Officers’ lack of awareness of a bond search condition did not permit reliance on it by court

Officers working a high crime area with a drug dog. They saw defendant and smelled burnt marijuana. They asked for consent and were refused, so they searched anyway. The trial court sustained the search because defendant was on a bond condition that permitted searches, even though the officers were unaware of it. Remanded for consideration of the officer’s lack of knowledge of the bond condition. Cantrell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 634, 673 S.E.2d 32 (2009).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense and nearly immediately consented. The evidence supported the trial court’s finding of consent, and the court distinguished defendant’s authority (State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn.1992)) where that defendant consented after five requests for consent. State v. Davis, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 60 (January 23, 2009).*

One officer on the premises executing a search warrant went to use the bathroom, and he lifted the toilet seat finding a tampon box floating with three watches with sales tags on them which were stolen property. This was a valid plain view. United States v. Watson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5179 (E.D. Pa. January 23, 2009).*

Prescription fraud by doctor case: The warrant sufficiently complied with Rule 41 that the defendant could not claim that he was prejudiced. The probable cause was writing prescriptions for heavy painkillers for CI’s who were not effectively treated. The warrant was not overbroad. United States v. Stack, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5193 (D. Utah January 22, 2009):

The First Warrant was not a general warrant because it contained the following limitations: Paragraph Three of the First Warrant; the patient list and drug list provided to the searching agents; and the nature of the crime alleged (distribution of a controlled substance). Moreover, the broad scope of the records to be searched was not problematic because the fourteen-page affidavit established probable cause to search the records listed in those five paragraphs. See, e.g., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Even a warrant that describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms may be valid when the description is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.”) (quoting David v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997)); Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 408 (10th Cir. 1985) (“The breadth of a warrant must be justified by the breadth of the probable cause.”) (Logan, J., concurring); United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The number of files that could be scrutinized … is not determinative. The search and seizure of large quantities of material is justified if the material is within the scope of probable cause underlying the warrant.”). In addition, the amount of documents seized was relatively small compared to the amount of documents in the office. (See Tr. at 19.) See also Voss, 774 F.2d at 405 (execution of search good evidence of whether warrant was overbroad).