E.D. N.Y.: Touching defendant to direct his movements communicated he was not free to leave

Touching the defendant’s elbow to direct and turn the defendant was a seizure because his movement was controlled and impeded. United States v. Bellamy, 592 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D. N.Y. 2009):

Certainly, Bellamy’s movement was impeded when Officer Ianno took him “by the elbow,” turned him around so that his back was facing the officers, and led him up the ramp to the entrance of the Buckingham building. (Tr. 23-26.) Thus, Officer Ianno exerted “physical force” over, and maintained physical contact with, Bellamy. Moreover, both officers restrained Bellamy’s liberty by directing him, rather than merely requesting that he move, up the ramp. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; see also United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir. 1990) (enumerating factors relevant to seizure inquiry, including “physical touching of the person by the officer”). In short, a reasonable person in Bellamy’s shoes would not have concluded at that point that he was free to leave. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. The court thus concludes that Bellamy was “seized,” as that term relates to the Fourth Amendment, when Officer Ianno took Bellamy by the elbow and turned him around and walked him up the ramp. See California v. Hodari P., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991) (“[t]he word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement”).

Seat belt civil infraction justified a stop, even though it was pre-planned. United States v. Holmes, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3698 (E.D. Mich. January 16, 2009):

It does not matter that the traffic stop was pre-planned. If probable cause exists, an officer may stop a vehicle for a civil infraction even when his true motivation for the stop is to search for contraband. Hill, 195 F.3d at 264 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13). The officer’s knowledge or suspicions about the traffic violator at the time of the stop is irrelevant. Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391. Simply put, “traffic stops based on probable cause, even if other motivations existed, are not illegal.” Id. at 392.

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