CA4: Video surveillance in open field not protected by Fourth Amendment

“The appellant in this case, Steve Vankesteren, invites us to consider the application of the Fourth Amendment to a product of modern surveillance technology: namely, a hidden, fixed-range, motion-activated video camera placed in the appellant’s open fields. We find that the protective wall of the Fourth Amendment does not shield the appellant from the Commonwealth’s use of such a camera, and we therefore affirm the decision of the district court.” United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009):

Given the facts of these Supreme Court decisions [Hester (1924), Oliver (1984), Dunn (1987)], Vankesteren has little on which to base his case. Vankesteren’s fields were located a mile or more from his home, the land was being used for farming and not intimate activities, VDGIF had received a report of a trapped protected bird, and there is no indication in the record that Vankesteren had taken any steps to protect his field from observation. Therefore, under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the subject land must be classified as open fields and not curtilage, and Vankesteren has no reasonable expectation of privacy in those open fields.

As noted previously, Vankesteren has essentially conceded this point. Vankesteren instead stakes his case on the argument that hidden surveillance cameras are subject to a higher degree of Fourth Amendment scrutiny. He cites cases in support of that proposition; yet, none of these cases involve open fields where the defendant presumably has no reasonable expectation of privacy.

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