S.D.N.Y.: Can’t tell whether Samson applies to NY parole searches

It is not clear whether Samson applies to New York parolees for a suspicionless search. Here, however, there was suspicion, so that question does not have to be decided. United States v. White, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102015 (S.D. N.Y. December 16, 2008)

Courts disagree as to whether or not the relevant parole regulation in New York is similar to the California statute at issue in Samson, and thus there is no consensus on whether or not Samson applies to cases involving New York parolees. Several courts have noted in dicta that New York does not have a statute similar to the California statute at issue in Samson, and they declined to decide whether the parole regulation and waiver signed by parolees in New York are sufficiently similar to the California statute for Samson to apply, instead finding the searches lawful on other grounds. See Alvarado v. City of New York, 482 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (“Samson specifically addressed a California parole statute that explicitly allowed for a search without cause by a parole officer. New York does not have an analogous provision.”) (internal citation omitted); Gathers v. White, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9054, at *9, fn. 4 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 8, 2007) (noting that New York does not have parole-specific statutory search provisions and declining to decide whether the features of “New York’s parole landscape mean that New York allows the sort of suspicionless search of parolees that California does”); United States v. Justiniano, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27709, *14-*15 (W.D.N.Y. May 29, 2008) (declining to apply Samson standard of suspicionless searches of parolees because “New York has no analogous statute” to the one at issue in Samson). However, opinions by other judges have suggested that the New York parole regulation and waiver are similar to the California statute in Samson. See United States v. Massey, 461 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 2006) (Miner, J. concurring) (finding the “waiver” signed by parolees authorizing searches in New York to be, “for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from the ‘waiver’ apparently signed in Samson in the form prescribed by California law”); United States v. Stuckey, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58173, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the relevant parole regulation in New York is “[s]imilar to the California statute at issue in Samson” and holding that Samson may be dispositive, and in any case, the search was rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer’s duties).

In addition to the open question of whether or not Samson applies to cases involving New York parolees, the scope of Samson’s holding is unclear. The suspicionless search at issue in Samson was a search of the parolee’s person. At no point in the opinion does the Supreme Court address the issue of whether a suspicionless search of a parolee’s residence is permitted by the Fourth Amendment, under the California statute or otherwise.