IL: Hot pursuit: Violation of neighboring state’s hot pursuit law does not mandate exclusion of evidence

Hot pursuit of a drug offender from Chicago into Illinois did not require suppression of anything from the Indiana arrest in violation of Indiana law in an Illinois prosecution. People v. Galan, 229 Ill. 2d 484, 893 N.E.2d 597, 323 Ill. Dec. 325 (2008), revg People v. Galan, 367 Ill. App. 3d 876, 856 N.E.2d 511, 305 Ill. Dec. 706 (2006):

We agree with the State that defendant’s arrest should not be quashed nor the evidence against him suppressed. The Supreme Court has stated that to determine whether a governmental action violates the fourth amendment, courts must “inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the [fourth] Amendment was framed.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-300, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 414, 119 S. Ct. at 1300. This does not mean, as defendant suggests, however, that we must examine the common law of arrest as it existed in Indiana before the adoption of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. Instead, as the State suggests, it means that we must examine the common law in place at the time of the enactment of the fourth amendment. As noted above, this court has already done this, stating, “[a]t common law, municipal and county police officers had no authority to arrest a defendant outside the territorial limits of the political entity which appointed them to their office. The sole exception to this rule at common law was when the officers were in ‘fresh pursuit’ of a suspected felon fleeing that jurisdiction.” Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382.

Here, the evidence clearly indicates that the Chicago police officers who eventually stopped defendant did so believing that he was engaged in drug trafficking and was attempting to escape. The Chicago police officers were thus in fresh pursuit of a person they suspected to be a fleeing felon. Pursuant to our analysis in Lahr, then, they had the commonlaw authority to effect an arrest of that person outside the territorial limits of the political entity that appointed them. Additionally, there is no question, and defendant has even agreed, that the arrest that occurred in this case was substantively authorized by Indiana statute. See Ind. Code Ann. §35-33-3-1 (Michie 1998).

It is also worth noting that defendant’s sole fourth amendment argument before this court revolves around his contention that Chicago police violated Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-3-2 (Michie 1998). This is not surprising considering the procedural posture of this case. As already detailed, defendant’s first filed motion to suppress was very broad, requesting the trial court quash his arrest and suppress, among other things, the “[p]hysical evidence discovered and as a result of arrest and detention” and “[a]ll other knowledge and fruits *** and products of the arrest.” After holding a detailed evidentiary hearing and considering extensive argument on this motion, including evidence and argument regarding the home search, the trial court denied the motion to quash and suppress. Before this court, defendant advances no fourth amendment argument other than that based upon Indiana statute. Accordingly, if we find no fourth amendment violation based upon Indiana statute, there is no other basis argued for us to find such a violation. Defendant already advanced a variety of other fourth amendment based arguments in the trial court, lost those arguments, and no longer advances them on appeal.

Violation of Indiana law by Chicago police officers did not mandate exclusion.

Considering the exclusionary rule itself, we note that the Supreme Court has stated that “[s]uppression of evidence *** has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” and applied the rule only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial societal costs. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 64, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. This court, in discussing the rule, has stated:

“[T]he exclusionary rule that accompanies the fourth amendment has no constitutional footing. Instead, it is a judicially created, prudential remedy that prospectively protects fourth amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct [Citations.] Its application has been trimmed to instances where its remedial objectives will be most effectively served. [Citation.] That is, it applies only where its deterrent benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 531-32.

Indeed, we have recognized that “[t]he State does not violate the fourth amendment when it introduces evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. [Citation.] Rather, a fourth amendment violation is ‘fully accomplished’ by the illegal search or seizure, and excluding evidence cannot undo the invasion of the defendant’s rights.” Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 531. As such, in Willis this court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in a situation where the fourth amendment was actually violated. See Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 831 N.E.2d 531, 294 Ill. Dec. 581. By contrast, in this case, there was no constitutional violation and exclusion is even less warranted. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 577, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681 (2006) (statutory violations only remotely related to the gathering of evidence do not ordinarily trigger application of the exclusionary rule).