Condition of probation which authorizes nonconsensual, suspicionless searches is unconstitutional

In the absence of statutory authority, a condition of probation which authorizes nonconsensual, suspicionless searches is unconstitutional. State v. Bennett, 39 Kan. App. 2d 890, 185 P.3d 320 (2008), certiorari granted State v. Bennett, 2008 Kan. LEXIS 517 (Kan., Sept. 22, 2008).

Terry supported search of defendant’s purse for weapons when officer returned it to her after a stop. Speten v. State, 2008 WY 63, 185 P.3d 25 (2008):

[*P24] Under Terry analysis, the question is this: at the time he searched the appellant’s purse, did Deputy Seeman have a reasonable suspicion that the appellant was engaged in criminal activity, and if so, did the officer safety concern that engendered Terry justify the deputy’s search of the appellant’s purse minutes after the encounter began, and just as it was about to end? Asked more plainly, did Deputy Seeman have the right to pick up the appellant’s purse and search it before handing it to her so she could leave? We conclude that, while this was not the typical fact pattern that leads to a Terry “stop and frisk,” Deputy Seeman did, at the time of the search, have reasonable suspicion that the appellant was engaged in criminal activity, and Deputy Seeman did, at the time of the search, have reasonable apprehension as to officer safety. An officer safety concern does not necessarily exist at only one precise moment in time during an investigative detention, and we believe the rationale of Terry would allow a limited search for weapons at any time during that detention that the officer safety concern becomes apparent.

Public safety stop as a secondary reason must be based on articulable reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. The stop here was not, so the search was suppressed. State v. McCaddon, 39 Kan. App. 2d
839, 185 P.3d 309 (2008).*

Defendant’s flight after stop from a vehicle not registered to him justified his pursuit and it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Cardelus v. State, 985 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. App. 5th DCA 2008):

A number of Florida decisions have ruled that flight alone does not provide a sufficient basis upon which to form a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop. See J.R.P. v. State, 942 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); J.D.H. v. State, 967 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). While there was no evidence that the events in the instant case occurred in a high crime area, as in Wardlow, there were other factors beyond mere flight to justify pursuit and investigation. In particular, Livingston abandoned a vehicle he clearly did not own on a public street.