Drug dog sniff was not found to be a search under the state constitution because, although the state constitution on searches and seizures can be interpreted differently than the Fourth Amendment, there was no development of the issue to show why in this case. State v. Harris, 372 Ark. 492, 277 S.W.3d 568 (2008).*
Comment: Arkansas has diverted from the Fourth Amendment in a couple of areas, but the fact a state has as to one issue does not mean that it will as to another. A litigant has to show why and how it is justified. Merely citing to it does nothing. This is the general rule, which is actually articulated far better in other jurisdictions: See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bond, 693 A.2d 220, 225 ¶ 30 (Pa. Super. 1997):
Generally, in each case implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, litigants are required to brief and analyze at least the following four factors: (1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; (2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law; (3) related case law from other states; and, (4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (1991).
Babiarz v. Town of Grafton, 155 N.H. 757, 930 A.2d 395, 399 (2007):
Since the defendant has neither specified any portion of the Federal Constitution that he contends has been violated, nor offered a fully developed legal argument citing federal constitutional authority in support of his position, we decline to analyze his assertions under the Federal Constitution. See State v. Chick, 141 N.H. 503, 504, 688 A.2d 553 (1996) (passing reference to constitutional claim renders argument waived). The plaintiff’s state constitutional argument is likewise undeveloped, and therefore we refrain from addressing it. See In the Matter of Thayer and Thayer, 146 N.H. 342, 347, 777 A.2d 845 (2001); Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499, 543 A.2d 1379 (1988) (“off-hand invocations” of constitutional rights supported by neither argument nor authority warrant no extended consideration).
In re Brianna B., 66 Conn.App. 695, 785 A.2d 1189, 1191 n.2 (2001):
The petitioner claims that the court’s actions violate article first, § 5, of the constitution of Connecticut. The respondent cites to State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 363-87, 655 A.2d 737 (1995), for the proposition that the state constitution “provides greater protection of freedom of speech and of the press than the federal constitution.” That statement with nothing more does not constitute an independent analysis of the state constitutional claim. See id., at 379, 655 A.2d 737 (setting forth proper considerations provided in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), for claimed violation under state constitution). We therefore deem abandoned the claim under the state constitution and restrict our review to the claimed violation under the federal constitution.
No state has perhaps better analyzed independent state constitutional grounds than Oregon. See, e.g., State v. Flores, 280 Or. 273, 570 P.2d 965 (1977), a case where the majority did not diverge from Fourth Amendment precedent in one area:
The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 318-19 (1977), suggests four criteria that state courts should consider in engaging in an independent interpretation of their own state constitutions. They are: (1) the similarity of the state and federal provisions; (2) relevant state precedents; (3) unique local conditions; and (4) the position taken by the United States Supreme Court. To these considerations we would add a fifth the need for a uniform standard in the area of law under discussion. State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 183, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974).
Later, Oregon went to historical references. State v. Dixson, 87 Or. App. 1, 740 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (1987):
The decisive issue is not, as the trial court apparently thought, one of federal law. Whether defendant’s land is constitutionally protected depends, in the first instance, not on United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment, but on the basic principles underlying the Oregon Constitution. We derive our analysis from them. See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983). While those principles may be similar to those underlying the Fourth Amendment, we need not join the federal retreat from the constitutional requirements.
. . .
We believe it obvious that the constitution protects property in order to protect something more-one’s personalty or individuality-from official control. It does so by adapting traditional trespass law to create areas where officials may not go. Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment are the direct product of the experience that Americans had during the pre-revolutionary period with uncontrolled executive power. The colonists (and their supporters in England) looked to safeguards against arbitrary searches and seizures as one of the bulwarks of the liberty for which they fought the Revolution. See Jensen, The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution, 1763-1776, 155-58, 258, 377-78 (1968); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 300-303 n. 1 (1st ed. 1868).
The tie between liberty and the right to exclude others from one’s property remained basic in American thinking after the Revolution. In one’s home one could be oneself. Writers frequently quoted a statement the Earl of Chatham, an English supporter of the American colonists, made before the revolution:
“The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the king of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.” Quoted in Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, supra, 299 n. 3.
Over a century later, the United States Supreme Court made a similar point in describing the heart of a violation of the Fourth Amendment:
“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense ***.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). (Emphasis supplied.)
See also West key number 30k1079 (claim must be adequately briefed to be decided).
