Consent obtained under false claim a search warrant was coming was invalid

False assertion that search warrant was coming tainted consent. State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 175 P.3d 801 (App. 2007):

In the case before us, the district court made a factual finding, which is supported by the evidence, that before Tietsort consented to a search of outbuildings and vehicles, the officers told him that they were waiting for a search warrant to arrive. The district court also found that Tietsort’s consent to a search of his outbuildings and vehicles was voluntary. In making this finding of voluntariness, however, the court did not consider whether the officers’ assertions to Tietsort that they had discovered stolen items and could obtain a search warrant constituted an exploitation of any illegality in the prior search that tainted the consent and rendered it involuntary.

A consent is not rendered invalid merely because an officer has said that a warrant will be sought if consent is refused, … but a false representation that the officer possesses a warrant amounts to coercion. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968). The State’s burden to show that consent was freely and voluntarily given cannot be met by “showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. at 548-49. The Bumper opinion explains: “When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion–albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.” Id. at 550. Here, officers did not falsely represent that they possessed a warrant, but they did assert the ability and intent to obtain one. An officer’s false, erroneous or baseless representation of the ability to obtain a warrant weighs against a finding of voluntariness, …. (citations omitted)

Officers had probable cause based on defendant’s meeting up with CI and what they heard on the wire about drugs and counting of money. United States v. Easter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93235 (M.D. Pa. December 18, 2007).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a suppression motion because it would not prevail on the merits, which the court determines under the IAC claim. There was cause for the defendant’s stop and the gun was seen in plain view. State v. Altman, 2007 Ohio 6761, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5935 (5th Dist. December 14, 2007).*

A school search was reasonable when it was based on a note passed that was only reasonably interpreted as a threat to kill another student. In re Garn, 2007 Ohio 6765, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5941 (5th Dist. December 13, 2007).* (Comment: A threat of violence in school always leads to a search being sustained.)