Use of stolen ID to rent storage unit defeated expectation of privacy

Use of stolen identity to rent a storage unit did not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the storage unit. United States v. Johnson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81465 (D. Utah November 2, 2007):

While Defendant acknowledges that the storage unit was rented using a false name, he contends that he had an expectation of privacy in the storage unit because he placed his personal property inside it, paid the fees for it, placed a lock upon it, and never disavowed an interest in it. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether Defendant could have subjectively believed that this storage unit could remain free from a search if the fraudulent rental agreement was discovered by the storage facility employees, the police, or Haroldsen. The evidence indicates that Defendant directed Christensen to enter into the rental agreement using Haroldsen’s driver license. The rental agreement, itself, provides that only Shannon Haroldsen had authority to enter the unit.

Even if the court found that Defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the storage unit, society does not recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable. Defendant fraudulently used a stolen identity to rent a storage unit in an attempt to conceal criminal activities. It is not objectively reasonable to assume that the individual whose name has been used for such improper purposes would not have the right to consent to a search of the unit. Prohibiting Haroldsen, a victim of identity theft, from assisting law enforcement in the investigation of crimes perpetrated with the use of her name would elevate the privacy rights of Defendant over the rights of Haroldsen to clear her name. Defendant forfeited his privacy rights to the storage unit when he directed Christensen to enter into a fraudulent rental agreement in Haroldsen’s name. Society has no interest in protecting the rights of someone using another person’s name to fraudulently conceal his criminal activities.

A minimal description of things to be seized distinguishes this search warrant from the one in Groh v. Ramirez. Thus, the search was valid despite the general additional phrase “[o]r any other evidence indicative of the criminal offense of Burglary, Theft or Possession of Stolen Property.” United States v. Sims, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81517 (C.D. Ill. November 2, 2007):

This court concludes that this is a close case. The description provided in the search warrant is certainly lacking in detail, and the warrant does not incorporate by reference Weinstock’s affidavit, which did include a description of particular items, such as the Aussie grill and yellow welder. However, this court agrees with the Government that Groh is distinguishable because the warrant in this case did include a description of the things to be seized. The Seventh Circuit has stated that, while a warrant must “describe the objects of the search with reasonable specificity, it need not be elaborately detailed.” United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1290 (7th Cir. 1995). A warrant need not “enable authorities to ‘minutely identify every item for which they are searching.'” United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1987), quoting United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1984). It is sufficient if the executing officers are able “to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty.” Jones, 54 F.3d at 1290. “If detailed particularity is impossible, generic language is permissible if it particularizes the types of items to be seized.” United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996 (7th Cir. 1998).