CA: Subpoena for occupancy tax audit did not violate Fourth Amendment

Administrative subpoenas for motel occupancy tax audit purposes were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment under Oklahoma Press. Administrative search cases are “inapt.” [This subject is discussed at length in Ch. 39 of the Treatise.] City of Santa Cruz v. Patel, 155 Cal. App. 4th 234, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 824 (6th Dist. 2007):

“As regulatory schemes have become increasingly important in enforcing laws designed to protect the public’s health and welfare, reliance on ‘probable cause’ as a means of restraining agency subpena power has all but disappeared. (See United States v. Morton Salt Co. (1950) 338 U.S. 632, 641-643; see also 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed. 1978) Investigation, § 4.2, pp. 228-232.)” (Craib v. Bulmash (1989) 49 Cal.3d 475, 481.) Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling (1946) 327 U.S. 186 (Oklahoma Press) explained the interaction between Fourth Amendment principles and administrative investigations. Oklahoma Press was discussed in detail in Craib v. Bulmash, supra, 49 Cal.3d 475. Because it is so directly pertinent to the issue at hand, we quote at length from that discussion.

. . .

“Accordingly, Oklahoma Press articulated a test which applied Fourth Amendment requirements only by analogy. The notion that a subpena could be enforced only where a specific charge or complaint is pending was explicitly rejected. Instead, said the court, the investigation need only be for ‘a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of [the legislative body] to command.’ (327 U.S. at p. 209, italics added.) In addition, the requirement of ‘”probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,” literally applicable in the case of a warrant,’ is satisfied as long as the subpenaed documents are ‘relevant’ to the inquiry. (Ibid., italics added.) ‘Beyond this the requirement of reasonableness, including particularity in “describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” also literally applicable to warrants, comes down to specification of the documents to be produced adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry.’ (Ibid., italics added.) In a later case, the court emphasized that, while the subpena may be issued and served by the agency, the subpenaed party must have the opportunity for judicial review before suffering any penalties for refusing to comply. (See v. City of Seattle (1967) 387 U.S. 541, 544-545 [in dictum].) [P] This test has been routinely applied by the high court to reject various Fourth Amendment challenges to official demands for records.” (Craib v. Bulmash, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 481-482, fn. omitted.)

The government had reasonable suspicion for a stop of the defendant’s vehicle with blacked out windows on the border near Calexico, California. This was reasonable suspicion under Arvizu: “The scouting activity, the manner in which the Honda SUV was being operated, the vehicle’s appearance all fit the familiar and specific profile for drug smuggling. The determination of the agents was buttressed by their experience in which virtually every vehicle of the many vehicles stopped under similar circumstances had been determined to be smuggling narcotics. Reasonable suspicion abounded to strip the vehicle on Interstate 8 and detain Defendants.” United States v. Payan-Valenzuela, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68360 (S.D. Cal. September 14, 2007).*

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