WA concludes that a misdemeanor arrest warrant authorizes an entry to arrest only; pretextual searches will not be tolerated

The Washington Supreme Court held that a misdemeanor arrest warrant authorizes police to enter to make an arrest, but only an arrest. It finds it cannot distinguish Payton from misdemeanor arrest warrants because a neutral and detached magistrate made a probable cause finding. The court added, however, that it will not permit the use of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for search of a home. State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn. 2d 390m 166 P.3d 698 (2007). This is an interesting holding that merits reading, but here is just a part:

Here the warrant was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. A judicial officer determined there was probable cause to believe a crime was committed and Schinnell committed that crime. This determination constitutes authority of law that justifies an intrusion into the suspect’s home to execute the arrest under limited circumstances. Hatchie, on the other hand, essentially asks us to hold police may never enter a residence on a misdemeanor arrest warrant.

Considering we have held felony arrest warrants provide limited authority to effect an arrest in the home, we see no way to distinguish a misdemeanor arrest warrant to not provide similar authority of law. To do so would create a system whereby some warrants provide authority of law and some do not. As we see it, an arrest warrant is either authority of law to invade the home or it is not.

Of course, but for that warrant, police entry into a private home to make a misdemeanor arrest is per se invalid. As our Court of Appeals said, “When the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.” Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 (footnote omitted); see id. at 749 n.11 (“Because we conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.”).

Of course, there is room for the police to abuse this authority. Therefore, we take pains to point out an arrest warrant does not allow for a general search of the premises. Rather, it allows the police only the limited ability to enter the residence, find the suspect, arrest him, and leave. Police action that deviates from the narrow bounds of this authority has no authority of law. In the past we have carefully scrutinized police conduct when they effectuate an arrest warrant, and we have not hesitated to suppress evidence gained from unauthorized extensions of an officer’s arrest authority. See Chrisman II, 100 Wn.2d at 820; State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 118 P.3d 307 (2005). In Chrisman II, we considered whether an officer’s search incident to arrest violated article I, section 7. 5 We focused on the officer’s actions after he arrested the suspects. We “recognized that the presence of an officer, which is initially lawful, can be rendered unlawful by his movement.” Chrisman II, 100 Wn.2d at 820. But here we are asking if the officers’ initial presence was lawful, not if some later act after the arrest exceeded the officers’ scope of their authority. …

Similarly, the police cannot use an arrest warrant–misdemeanor or otherwise–as a pretext for conducting a search or other investigation of someone’s home. As the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington (ACLU-WA) points out in its amicus brief, there are thousands of misdemeanor arrest warrants in the state that have not been served. Amicus Curiae Br. of ACLU-WA at 9-10. Here while Hatchie at times alluded to a pretext argument, he never specifically raised such an argument so we do not consider it. But we do note that the police cannot use arrest warrants as a guise or pretext to otherwise conduct a speculative criminal investigation or a search. State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 644, 374 P.2d 989 (1962) (“An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.” (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961))); see Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 353 (“Just as an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence, a traffic infraction may not be used as a pretext to stop to investigate for a sufficient reason to search even further.”). A sounder practice would be for police to secure a search warrant for a particular premise. A neutral magistrate’s determination that police have probable cause to search a particular residence gives police broader authority when they enter a home and also negates any suspicion of a pretextual intrusion to effectuate an investigation.