Taking the SWAT team to a wholesale administrative search violated administrative warrant exception

Eleventh Circuit holds today that a Florida automobile salvager subjected to an administrative search by the local SWAT team should not have had his § 1983 case dismissed by the district court. Plaintiff sold a car that had a wrong VIN number on it [because the car came from a government seizure], and the chop shop investigators decided to conduct an administrative search. The “administrative search” here was too filled with discretion and went way too far for the limits imposed on an administrative search. Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2007). This is an interesting and wonderful opinion. The facts are, in a word, startling:

The two officers decided to conduct an administrative inspection of the Premises, as authorized by Florida Statute § 812.055. The statute permits a warrantless physical inspection of salvage yards and repair shops (among other businesses) during normal business hours “for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles …; investigating the titling and registration of vehicles …; inspecting vehicles … wrecked or dismantled; or inspecting records required [to be kept by such businesses]. Id.

On January 15, 2001, at about 10:30 in the morning, Root, Glantz, and Edward Kelly led a group of approximately twenty officers to the Premises. The officers arrived in unmarked trucks and SUVs, and surrounded the entire Premises, blocking all exits. Some of the officers were dressed in SWAT uniforms-–ballistic vests imprinted with SWAT in big letters, camouflage pants, and black boots. They entered the Premises with guns drawn – all were armed with Glock 21 sidearms; some carried Bennelli automatic shotguns. When the officers entered the Premises, they ordered the employees to line up along the fence. Vincent Lewis, who was working on a car, felt something touch his back and turned around to find an officer pointing a shotgun at him. The officers patted down and searched the employees. Pockets and purses were searched. The officers took at least Lewis’s driver’s license.

Judy Bass, the office manager, testified that she gave the officers paperwork showing that the car purchased by the complaining citizen had mismatched VINs because Bruce had purchased the car with the mismatched VINs from a government theft recovery program and was authorized to resell it that way. Root admitted receiving this paperwork during the search, but testified that it had “no bearing on his investigation.” Bruce arrived at the Premises about ten minutes after the officers. Kelly told him that the officers were there to do an administrative records check. Another officer asked Bruce if he had the titles to all the cars that he had on the lot. Bruce gave the titles to the officer.

. . .

At approximately 1:00 p.m., the officers began to thoroughly search the Premises. They went through every file, including tax, bookkeeping, and accounting records, and the office computer. They inspected all 150 plus vehicles on the lot-–cutting some open with chain saws. These activities-–including the detention of at least several employees-–continued until after 6:00 p.m.

The warrantless administrative inspection, however, remains an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general rule that a warrant–-supported by probable cause and specifying what is to be seized-–is required when law enforcement seeks to search private property. The warrantless administrative inspection, however, remains an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general rule that a warrant-–supported by probable cause and specifying what is to be seized-–is required when law enforcement seeks to search private property. The administrative search exception does not confer authority on law enforcement to ignore the requirement for a warrant where “the primary purpose [of the search or seizure] was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). In Burger, the Court rejected the idea that an administrative inspection may be used to gather evidence as part of what is, in reality, a criminal investigation. 482 U.S. at 691 and 716 n. 27. The Court upheld the inspection of Burger’s automobile junkyard, in part, because “[t]here [was], furthermore, no reason to believe that the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of respondent’s violation of the penal laws.” Id. See also United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1993) (an administrative inspection is a “sham” where it is “a pretext solely to gather evidence of criminal activity”).

Furthermore, even when permitted, the Constitution requires that administrative inspections be “appropriately limited.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. The authorizing statute must “carefully limit[] their time, place, and scope.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 718 (Brennan, J., dissenting, but noting no disagreement with the Court’s “general rule”).

Nor may an authorizing statute commit the conduct of such an inspection to the unbridled discretion of the inspector. Id. at 703. The statute must “limit the discretion of the inspecting officers” and the inspection must have a “properly defined scope.” Id. There must be “reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an … inspection.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). “Where a statute authorizes the inspection but makes no rules governing the procedures that inspectors must follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive rules apply.” Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). The fundamental function of these rules is to protect citizens from the “unbridled discretion [of] executive and administrative officers.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).