The informant had been corroborated by the police. While he was not a model citizen, he got nothing in return except an expected good word with the prosecutor, which was to his benefit. The key, however, was corroboration. United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007):
In this instance, the CI was not a model citizen — he sported a criminal record and unresolved state criminal charges were looming. The defendant asserts that the police knew little or nothing more about the CI. He adds that, although no money had been offered or explicit promises made, the CI obviously expected a good reference from the officers to the local district attorney as a quid pro quo for the tip.
This assertion understates what the police knew and when they knew it. For one thing, the CI was not anonymous. Since he was known to the police, he could have been held accountable if his information proved inaccurate or false. Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (suggesting that informant’s reliability was buttressed by the fact that he risked prosecution should he make a false report). For another thing, at the time of the tip that prompted the arrest, the CI had been cooperating with the authorities for approximately one month. During that period, Cashman had several interactions with him. Moreover, even prior to July 7, the CI had provided trustworthy information and had demonstrated his knowledge of the drug trade in the Portland area. Thus, by July 29 the CI had compiled some record of reliability.
The defendant raised a host of problems with the search including the files in the U.S. District Clerk’s office not being in order, a computer search occurring where the only basis was that in two picture the screen was not lit in an earlier one and lit in a later one [bump the mouse?], overbreadth, failure to knock and announce (foreclosed by Hudson), none of which prevailed. It was a complex financial fraud case, and the government gets more leeway there. United States v. Tylman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61638 (C.D. Ill. August 22, 2007).*
Defendant was illegally stopped and searched and the gun on him suppressed. His friend was the object of the police interest, but he was stopped too. “Watson stated that Kielb ‘stopped [Alston]. Said, we need to talk to you, ….'” An unintended stop is still governed by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Stewart, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61715 (E.D. Va. August 22, 2007):
This “seizure” inquiry has three features relevant here. First, it is an objective test. It does not turn on the subjective belief of the defendant, nor on the subjective intentions of the officer. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (holding that the standard “is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.”).
Second, to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, the inquiry “tak[es] into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter ….” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. Application of the “totality of the circumstances” test involves the assessment of “numerous factors,” including, but not limited to:
. the time, place and purpose of the encounter,
. the words used by the officer,
. the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor,
. the officer’s statements to others present during the encounter,
. the threatening presence of several officers,
. the potential display of a weapon by an officer, and
. the physical touching by the police of the citizen.United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437; Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
Finally, “an unintended person may be the object of the detention,” so long as the detention is the result of an officer’s willful act. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2405 (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (ellipses and brackets omitted)). Thus, the conduct of officers who stop person “A” may, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, effect a stop of person “B” as well, where a reasonable person in person “B’s” shoes would conclude from the officers’ conduct that he, too, was not free to leave.
This principle has found its application in cases where officers, by show of authority in seizing one person, also seize another. In United States v. Goddard, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1791093 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 2007), police officers approached a group of four men, among them the defendant, who were standing together. 2007 WL 1791093 at *1. ….
