GA: Any law enforcement officer may conduct a probation search with knowledge of the condition, as long is it is not arbitrary or harassing

Georgia holds that acceptance of probation with a condition that any law enforcement officer may conduct a probation search made this search valid as preapproved consent. There was no showing that the officers were arbitrary or harassing. Peardon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 158, 651 S.E.2d 121 (2007):

A law enforcement officer may conduct a search pursuant to a special condition of probation “at any time, day or night, and with or without a warrant, provided there exists a reasonable or good-faith suspicion for search, that is, the police must not merely be acting in bad faith or in an arbitrary and capricious manner (such as searching to harass [the] probationer).” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Reece v. State, 257 Ga. App. 137, 140 (2) (570 SE2d 424) (2002).

At the hearing on Peardon’s motion to suppress, the trial court explained that it had imposed the consent to search as a special condition of probation, and that Peardon’s tacit acceptance of this mandatory condition should not be construed as a waiver of any constitutional right. The only choice Peardon made, the trial court explained, was to accept the conditions of his probation or to refuse them, in which case he would have served six months. The trial court’s order confirmed its finding that the search conditions had been imposed as a special condition of probation.

Peardon’s tacit acceptance of this special condition provided police with the authority to search him, his van, and his house pursuant to a tip. See Reece, supra, 257 Ga. App. at 139-140 (2) (information that defendant was living with a drug user and had appeared intoxicated provided reasonable suspicion to search probationer); State v. Cauley, 282 Ga. App. 191, 195 (1) (638 SE2d 351) (2006) (parolee consented to search as condition of parole, and search was not conducted in bad faith).

Georgia also held that same day that a parole search was valid because it was a condition of parole. Thomas v. State, 287 Ga. App. 163, 651 S.E.2d 116 (2007).*

Plaintiff’s claim that the defendant City wrongfully tore down his house stated a Fourth Amendment seizure claim that was distinct from a Fifth Amendment takings claim that was not yet ripe. Perez v. City of Pharr, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57718 (S.D. Tex. August 7, 2007).

Officers found defendant with a woman who had previously been arrested by the same officers, and they found she had a child who had been left alone at a motel room. They asked if they could go with her to check on the child and did, and the child was fine. They then asked for consent to search for weapons in the room, which was found to have been valid on the totality, and drugs were found. Miller v. State, 287 Ga. App. 179, 651 S.E.2d 103 (2007).*

Incriminating nature of a baggie for drugs was immediately apparent for a plain view. “The relatively small size of the protruding portion of the baggie did not undermine the incriminating character of the observed item.” State v. Norman, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 880 (August 8, 2007).*