IL: Stop after reasonable suspicion dissipated suppressed

Defendant, a man, was stopped because he was driving the van of a female friend for whom there was a warrant out. Before the stop, however, the officer saw that the driver was not the wanted person, but stopped him anyway and asked for his DL. The stop was without reasonable suspicion because it dissipated between first observation of the vehicle and seeing the driver was obviously not the wanted person. People v. Cummings, 2014 IL 115769, 2014 Ill. LEXIS 106 (March 20, 2014), affg People v. Cummings, 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, 368 Ill. Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162 (2013):

[*P26] Those cases do stand for the proposition that a police officer may always request identification during a traffic stop, even after reasonable suspicion evaporates. See also, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 250 Ill. Dec. 542 (2000) (stating, without citation, that “[w]hen a police officer is engaged in a minor traffic stop, he may briefly detain the driver to request a valid driver’s license”); People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 163, 649 N.E.2d 605, 208 Ill. Dec. 549 (1995); People v. Jennings, 185 Ill. App. 3d 164, 169, 541 N.E.2d 155, 133 Ill. Dec. 318 (1989). Some federal appeals courts, as well as courts in other states, have adopted a similar rule. See, e.g., United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2008) (“During a traffic stop, an officer may detain the occupants of the vehicle ‘while the officer completes a number of routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks related to the traffic violation,'” including requesting the driver’s license.); United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver’s license and vehicle registration ***.”); State v. Candelaria, 2011 NMCA 001, 149 N.M. 125, 245 P.3d 69, 75 (N.M. App. 2010) (“As long as the vehicle has been validly stopped, for whatever reason, police may always ask the driver to produce” license, registration, or insurance documents, “even after the original suspicion evaporates,” because the driver has no legitimate expectation of privacy in such documents.). But such a broad rule, however attractive in its simplicity and valuable in its potential to detect crime, stands on weak constitutional footing. Simply put, unless a request for identification is related to the reason for the stop, it impermissibly extends the stop and violates the Constitution. To the extent Illinois appellate court cases, including Hernandez, Bradley, and Bartimo, hold otherwise, they are overruled.

[*P27] We note in closing that the State does not contend this was a consensual encounter. Officer Bland asked for the defendant’s license, registration, and proof of insurance before he informed the defendant of the reason for the stop, and he never gave the defendant an “all clear.” See United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006). Of course, a police officer need not inform a driver that he or she is free to leave before making further inquiries. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996); but see People v. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819, 587 N.E.2d 592, 167 Ill. Dec. 323 (1992) (holding that, once a police officer determined that a defendant’s temporary registration was valid, “it just naturally follows” that the officer would “approach the defendant, explain the reason for the stop, apologize, and advise defendant he was free to leave”). But something must occur to terminate a traffic stop that has lost its justification and become unlawful before we can analyze any inquiries as consensual.

[*P28] Our holding is limited to the facts in this case. Because Officer Bland lacked reasonable suspicion after he learned the defendant could not be the subject of the outstanding arrest warrant, his request for the defendant’s license impermissibly prolonged the stop and violated the fourth amendment.